The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form

A generalized form of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalition variables is proposed. The character function of the new game is described by the Concave integral, which allows players to assign their preferred expected values only to some coalitions. It is shown that the new game will degenerate into...

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Main Authors: Jinhui Pang, Xiang Chen, Shujin Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2014-01-01
Series:Journal of Applied Mathematics
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/231508
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author Jinhui Pang
Xiang Chen
Shujin Li
author_facet Jinhui Pang
Xiang Chen
Shujin Li
author_sort Jinhui Pang
collection DOAJ
description A generalized form of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalition variables is proposed. The character function of the new game is described by the Concave integral, which allows players to assign their preferred expected values only to some coalitions. It is shown that the new game will degenerate into the Tsurumi fuzzy game when it is convex. The Shapley values of the proposed game have been investigated in detail and their simple calculation formula is given by a linear aggregation of the Shapley values on subdecompositions crisp coalitions.
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publishDate 2014-01-01
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spelling doaj-art-d4a2d8552fc84f4983c290985dcb99462025-08-20T03:23:48ZengWileyJournal of Applied Mathematics1110-757X1687-00422014-01-01201410.1155/2014/231508231508The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral FormJinhui Pang0Xiang Chen1Shujin Li2Library, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, ChinaPatent Examination Cooperation Center of the Patent Office, State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C, Beijing 100088, ChinaDepartment of Information Management, The Central Institute for Correctional Police, Baoding 071000, ChinaA generalized form of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalition variables is proposed. The character function of the new game is described by the Concave integral, which allows players to assign their preferred expected values only to some coalitions. It is shown that the new game will degenerate into the Tsurumi fuzzy game when it is convex. The Shapley values of the proposed game have been investigated in detail and their simple calculation formula is given by a linear aggregation of the Shapley values on subdecompositions crisp coalitions.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/231508
spellingShingle Jinhui Pang
Xiang Chen
Shujin Li
The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form
Journal of Applied Mathematics
title The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form
title_full The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form
title_fullStr The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form
title_full_unstemmed The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form
title_short The Shapley Values on Fuzzy Coalition Games with Concave Integral Form
title_sort shapley values on fuzzy coalition games with concave integral form
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/231508
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