The Disunity of Disease
In a recent paper, Harriet Fagerberg argues that the disease debate in the philosophy of medicine makes little sense as conceptual analysis but instead should proceed on the assumption that disease is a real kind. I propose an alternative view. The history and practice of medicine give us reasons t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University Library System, University of Pittsburgh
2025-07-01
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| Series: | Philosophy of Medicine |
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| Online Access: | http://philmed.pitt.edu/philmed/article/view/240 |
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| Summary: | In a recent paper, Harriet Fagerberg argues that the disease debate in the philosophy of medicine makes little sense as conceptual analysis but instead should proceed on the assumption that disease is a real kind. I propose an alternative view. The history and practice of medicine give us reasons to doubt that the category of disease forms a real kind. Instead, drawing on work by Quill R. Kukla, I argue that the disease debate makes good sense on an understanding of disease as an institutional kind. As well as explaining key features of the disease debate, this can facilitate a philosophical understanding of disease that captures the eclectic scope of medicine and the complex reasons why conditions get classified as diseases.
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| ISSN: | 2692-3963 |