Mistake of law in the context of criminal offenses against the environment

One of the consequences of the expanding criminal-law cooperation accompanying European integration is the steady expansion of the body of law that those involved in a particular field of law need to be familiar with. It is no longer only a question of navigating the maze of domestic law; profession...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Elek Balázs
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Bar Association of Vojvodina, Novi Sad 2024-01-01
Series:Glasnik Advokatske komore Vojvodine
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Online Access:https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0017-0933/2024/0017-09332404452E.pdf
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Summary:One of the consequences of the expanding criminal-law cooperation accompanying European integration is the steady expansion of the body of law that those involved in a particular field of law need to be familiar with. It is no longer only a question of navigating the maze of domestic law; professionals must also navigate the even more complex framework of European legal development, the world of directives, framework decisions, Commission decisions, and regulations. There are also a number of criminal law provisions that are now directly shaped by EU rules. In this legal environment, even lawyers wishing to specialize in a narrowly defined field sometimes find it difficult to navigate it, which raises the question of whether a plea of "mistake of law" (i.e., a mistake in understanding the applicable law) can be accepted where the defendant lacked knowledge of that law. This paper focuses on criminal offenses against the environment in the Hungarian legal system, particularly the offense of damage to nature, and analyzes how mistakes of fact, mistakes as to the social danger of the act, and mistakes of law interact in that context. Drawing on recent Supreme Court decisions, the paper shows how criminal liability may be excluded due to a mistake as to the social danger of the act for laypersons who inadvertently violate complex, lesser-known administrative norms. By contrast, those with special expertise are held to a higher standard and generally cannot rely on ignorance of relevant legal provisions. The paper concludes that, while the maxim ignorantia iuris neminem excusat remains the rule, courts must assess what legal knowledge can "reasonably and realistically" be expected of a given defendant when determining criminal liability for criminal offenses against the environment.
ISSN:0017-0933
2683-5967