Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible

In the last twenty-five years, several authors have raised problems to the thesis that privileged self-knowledge is compatible with content externalism. In particular, the ‘slow-switching’ argument, which was originally put forth by Paul Boghossian (1989), aims to show that there is no satisfactory...

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Main Author: Sergio Armando Gallegos
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2015-05-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/37279
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author Sergio Armando Gallegos
author_facet Sergio Armando Gallegos
author_sort Sergio Armando Gallegos
collection DOAJ
description In the last twenty-five years, several authors have raised problems to the thesis that privileged self-knowledge is compatible with content externalism. In particular, the ‘slow-switching’ argument, which was originally put forth by Paul Boghossian (1989), aims to show that there is no satisfactory account of how we can have privileged knowledge about our own thoughts given content externalism. Though many philosophers have found ways to block the argument, no one has worried to address a major worry that Boghossian had when he presented the argument, which is to understand under which conditions privileged self-knowledge is possible given content externalism. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of why the ‘slow-switching’ argument fails and I show how the diagnosis enables us to provide a partial response to Boghossian’s worry.
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series Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
spelling doaj-art-d02ff81f067d4e648fa22bc90cae041a2025-08-20T02:09:52ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1808-17112015-05-0119210.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p19724507Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are CompatibleSergio Armando Gallegos0Metropolitan State University of Denver In the last twenty-five years, several authors have raised problems to the thesis that privileged self-knowledge is compatible with content externalism. In particular, the ‘slow-switching’ argument, which was originally put forth by Paul Boghossian (1989), aims to show that there is no satisfactory account of how we can have privileged knowledge about our own thoughts given content externalism. Though many philosophers have found ways to block the argument, no one has worried to address a major worry that Boghossian had when he presented the argument, which is to understand under which conditions privileged self-knowledge is possible given content externalism. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of why the ‘slow-switching’ argument fails and I show how the diagnosis enables us to provide a partial response to Boghossian’s worry. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/37279
spellingShingle Sergio Armando Gallegos
Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
title Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible
title_full Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible
title_fullStr Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible
title_full_unstemmed Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible
title_short Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible
title_sort why privileged self knowledge and content externalism are compatible
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/37279
work_keys_str_mv AT sergioarmandogallegos whyprivilegedselfknowledgeandcontentexternalismarecompatible