Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain
This paper explores a two-echelon tourism supply chain consisting of a hotel and an online travel agency. The upside hotel rooms can be sold through the downside hotel alliance and online travel agency. The hotel alliance, selling rooms at a lower price, is a direct sale platform with a negligible e...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2016-01-01
|
| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/5760139 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1850172330614980608 |
|---|---|
| author | Lei Yang Jingna Ji Kebing Chen |
| author_facet | Lei Yang Jingna Ji Kebing Chen |
| author_sort | Lei Yang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper explores a two-echelon tourism supply chain consisting of a hotel and an online travel agency. The upside hotel rooms can be sold through the downside hotel alliance and online travel agency. The hotel alliance, selling rooms at a lower price, is a direct sale platform with a negligible entry fee. Notwithstanding, the online travel agency sells the room at a higher price with related personalized service. Customers will be refunded partially in case of their cancellation or no-show. An integrated model and two decentralized models based on Bertrand and Stackelberg games are developed, respectively. The results show that when the wholesale price is lower than a certain value, both the hotel and the online travel agency can gain more profit from the Stackelberg game than that from the Bertrand game. In the case that the hotel allows overbooking, the optimal overbooking quantity is obtained. If the overbooking proportion is too high, overbooking is profitable for the hotel only when the overbooking cost is lower than a certain value. At the end of the study, some experiments are conducted to analyze the sensitivity of the optimal prices and profits in the light of certain parameters. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-cf79cab1c183481fba48960c8da43ec0 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2016-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-cf79cab1c183481fba48960c8da43ec02025-08-20T02:20:06ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2016-01-01201610.1155/2016/57601395760139Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply ChainLei Yang0Jingna Ji1Kebing Chen2School of Economics and Commerce, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510006, ChinaSchool of Economics and Commerce, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510006, ChinaDepartment of Mathematics, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210016, ChinaThis paper explores a two-echelon tourism supply chain consisting of a hotel and an online travel agency. The upside hotel rooms can be sold through the downside hotel alliance and online travel agency. The hotel alliance, selling rooms at a lower price, is a direct sale platform with a negligible entry fee. Notwithstanding, the online travel agency sells the room at a higher price with related personalized service. Customers will be refunded partially in case of their cancellation or no-show. An integrated model and two decentralized models based on Bertrand and Stackelberg games are developed, respectively. The results show that when the wholesale price is lower than a certain value, both the hotel and the online travel agency can gain more profit from the Stackelberg game than that from the Bertrand game. In the case that the hotel allows overbooking, the optimal overbooking quantity is obtained. If the overbooking proportion is too high, overbooking is profitable for the hotel only when the overbooking cost is lower than a certain value. At the end of the study, some experiments are conducted to analyze the sensitivity of the optimal prices and profits in the light of certain parameters.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/5760139 |
| spellingShingle | Lei Yang Jingna Ji Kebing Chen Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_full | Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_fullStr | Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_short | Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_sort | game models on optimal strategies in a tourism dual channel supply chain |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/5760139 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT leiyang gamemodelsonoptimalstrategiesinatourismdualchannelsupplychain AT jingnaji gamemodelsonoptimalstrategiesinatourismdualchannelsupplychain AT kebingchen gamemodelsonoptimalstrategiesinatourismdualchannelsupplychain |