Cooperative climate action under background risk
Abstract Addressing climate change requires collective action, yet individuals face a collective-risk social dilemma: we must invest in mitigation efforts at a personal cost, with no guarantee that others will contribute, while the benefits are shared globally. Economic theory predicts that the pres...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Nature Portfolio
2025-07-01
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| Series: | Scientific Reports |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-12340-9 |
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| author | Hao Luo Hanna de Boer Oliver Musshoff Daniel Hermann |
| author_facet | Hao Luo Hanna de Boer Oliver Musshoff Daniel Hermann |
| author_sort | Hao Luo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Addressing climate change requires collective action, yet individuals face a collective-risk social dilemma: we must invest in mitigation efforts at a personal cost, with no guarantee that others will contribute, while the benefits are shared globally. Economic theory predicts that the presence of background risk, such as geopolitical instability, pandemics, and economic crises, makes individuals more cautious, potentially reducing their contributions to collective climate protection. As these uncertainties grow, concerns arise that exogenous risks may weaken climate cooperation at a time when it is most urgent. To test this prediction, we conducted an economic laboratory experiment with treatments incorporating background risk into a threshold Public Goods Game framed around climate protection, with real carbon offset purchases linked to participants’ decisions in the experiment. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that background risk does not systematically lower the likelihood of reaching collective climate goals. This suggests that, under conditions where climate risks are well-communicated and cooperation incentives are strong, concerns about background risk undermining climate action may be less pronounced than anticipated. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-cee65629f018405b909515dc32e5aeaa |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2045-2322 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-07-01 |
| publisher | Nature Portfolio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Scientific Reports |
| spelling | doaj-art-cee65629f018405b909515dc32e5aeaa2025-08-20T03:42:57ZengNature PortfolioScientific Reports2045-23222025-07-0115111010.1038/s41598-025-12340-9Cooperative climate action under background riskHao Luo0Hanna de Boer1Oliver Musshoff2Daniel Hermann3Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, University of GöttingenUniversity of BonnDepartment of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, University of GöttingenUniversity of BonnAbstract Addressing climate change requires collective action, yet individuals face a collective-risk social dilemma: we must invest in mitigation efforts at a personal cost, with no guarantee that others will contribute, while the benefits are shared globally. Economic theory predicts that the presence of background risk, such as geopolitical instability, pandemics, and economic crises, makes individuals more cautious, potentially reducing their contributions to collective climate protection. As these uncertainties grow, concerns arise that exogenous risks may weaken climate cooperation at a time when it is most urgent. To test this prediction, we conducted an economic laboratory experiment with treatments incorporating background risk into a threshold Public Goods Game framed around climate protection, with real carbon offset purchases linked to participants’ decisions in the experiment. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that background risk does not systematically lower the likelihood of reaching collective climate goals. This suggests that, under conditions where climate risks are well-communicated and cooperation incentives are strong, concerns about background risk undermining climate action may be less pronounced than anticipated.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-12340-9Climate changeBackground riskPublic goods gameLaboratory experiment |
| spellingShingle | Hao Luo Hanna de Boer Oliver Musshoff Daniel Hermann Cooperative climate action under background risk Scientific Reports Climate change Background risk Public goods game Laboratory experiment |
| title | Cooperative climate action under background risk |
| title_full | Cooperative climate action under background risk |
| title_fullStr | Cooperative climate action under background risk |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperative climate action under background risk |
| title_short | Cooperative climate action under background risk |
| title_sort | cooperative climate action under background risk |
| topic | Climate change Background risk Public goods game Laboratory experiment |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-12340-9 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT haoluo cooperativeclimateactionunderbackgroundrisk AT hannadeboer cooperativeclimateactionunderbackgroundrisk AT olivermusshoff cooperativeclimateactionunderbackgroundrisk AT danielhermann cooperativeclimateactionunderbackgroundrisk |