Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts
At an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behaviour that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more...
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Wiley
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/9271651 |
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| author | Pilwon Kim |
| author_facet | Pilwon Kim |
| author_sort | Pilwon Kim |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | At an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behaviour that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more cooperators wins. In this work, we develop a population model with continual conflicts at various scales and show cooperation can be sustained even when interpersonal conflicts dominate, as long as the conflict size follows a power law. The power law assumption has been met in several observations from real-world conflicts. Specifically if the population is structured on a scale-free network, both the power law distribution of conflicts and the survival of cooperation can be naturally induced without assuming a homogeneous population or frequent relocation of members. On the scale-free network, even when most people become selfish from continual person-person conflicts, people on the hubs tend to remain unselfish and play a role as “repositories” of cooperation. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ced9e0adca76402199e815edec118a4a |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-ced9e0adca76402199e815edec118a4a2025-08-20T03:23:43ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262017-01-01201710.1155/2017/92716519271651Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed ConflictsPilwon Kim0Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST), Department of Mathematical Sciences, Ulsan Metropolitan City 689-798, Republic of KoreaAt an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behaviour that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more cooperators wins. In this work, we develop a population model with continual conflicts at various scales and show cooperation can be sustained even when interpersonal conflicts dominate, as long as the conflict size follows a power law. The power law assumption has been met in several observations from real-world conflicts. Specifically if the population is structured on a scale-free network, both the power law distribution of conflicts and the survival of cooperation can be naturally induced without assuming a homogeneous population or frequent relocation of members. On the scale-free network, even when most people become selfish from continual person-person conflicts, people on the hubs tend to remain unselfish and play a role as “repositories” of cooperation.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/9271651 |
| spellingShingle | Pilwon Kim Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts Complexity |
| title | Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts |
| title_full | Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts |
| title_fullStr | Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts |
| title_short | Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts |
| title_sort | evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/9271651 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pilwonkim evolutionofcooperationthroughpowerlawdistributedconflicts |