IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration

Recently, researchers have begun studying the role that third-party arbitration may play in the evolution of cooperation. Using the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD), they show that arbitration can mitigate the negative effects of perception errors on the stability of cooperative strategies. Open qu...

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Main Authors: Cody T. Ross, Thomas Fikes, Hillary Lenfesty, Richard McElreath
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2025-01-01
Series:Social Sciences and Humanities Open
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Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291124004017
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author Cody T. Ross
Thomas Fikes
Hillary Lenfesty
Richard McElreath
author_facet Cody T. Ross
Thomas Fikes
Hillary Lenfesty
Richard McElreath
author_sort Cody T. Ross
collection DOAJ
description Recently, researchers have begun studying the role that third-party arbitration may play in the evolution of cooperation. Using the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD), they show that arbitration can mitigate the negative effects of perception errors on the stability of cooperative strategies. Open questions, both theoretical and empirical, however, remain. To promote research on the role of third-party arbitration, we introduce an R package, IPDToolkit, which facilitates both simulation of synthetic data and Bayesian analysis of empirical data. To address theoretical questions, IPDToolkit provides a Monte Carlo simulation engine that can be used to generate play between arbitrary strategies in the IPD with arbitration and assess expected pay-offs. To address empirical questions, IPDToolkit provides customizable, Bayesian finite-mixture models that can be used to identify the strategies responsible for generating empirical game-play data. We present a complete workflow using IPDToolkit to teach end-users its functionality.
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spelling doaj-art-cc12ff254e05442d99ac623de589ca1d2025-08-20T02:37:09ZengElsevierSocial Sciences and Humanities Open2590-29112025-01-011110120410.1016/j.ssaho.2024.101204IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitrationCody T. Ross0Thomas Fikes1Hillary Lenfesty2Richard McElreath3Department of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany; Corresponding author.EdPlus Action Lab, Arizona State University, United States of AmericaSchool of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, United States of America; Institute of Human Origins, Arizona State University, United States of AmericaDepartment of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, GermanyRecently, researchers have begun studying the role that third-party arbitration may play in the evolution of cooperation. Using the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD), they show that arbitration can mitigate the negative effects of perception errors on the stability of cooperative strategies. Open questions, both theoretical and empirical, however, remain. To promote research on the role of third-party arbitration, we introduce an R package, IPDToolkit, which facilitates both simulation of synthetic data and Bayesian analysis of empirical data. To address theoretical questions, IPDToolkit provides a Monte Carlo simulation engine that can be used to generate play between arbitrary strategies in the IPD with arbitration and assess expected pay-offs. To address empirical questions, IPDToolkit provides customizable, Bayesian finite-mixture models that can be used to identify the strategies responsible for generating empirical game-play data. We present a complete workflow using IPDToolkit to teach end-users its functionality.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291124004017Prisoner’s dilemmaArbitrationGame theoryBehavioral economicsBayesian analysis
spellingShingle Cody T. Ross
Thomas Fikes
Hillary Lenfesty
Richard McElreath
IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration
Social Sciences and Humanities Open
Prisoner’s dilemma
Arbitration
Game theory
Behavioral economics
Bayesian analysis
title IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration
title_full IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration
title_fullStr IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration
title_full_unstemmed IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration
title_short IPDToolkit: An R package for simulation and Bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner’s dilemma game-play under third-party arbitration
title_sort ipdtoolkit an r package for simulation and bayesian analysis of iterated prisoner s dilemma game play under third party arbitration
topic Prisoner’s dilemma
Arbitration
Game theory
Behavioral economics
Bayesian analysis
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291124004017
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