Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of t...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Longfei Wei, Haiwei Wang, Jing Wang, Jialong Hou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/3985367
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1850173036027707392
author Longfei Wei
Haiwei Wang
Jing Wang
Jialong Hou
author_facet Longfei Wei
Haiwei Wang
Jing Wang
Jialong Hou
author_sort Longfei Wei
collection DOAJ
description This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of two sequential-move games, public leadership, and private leadership games. Numerical simulations present complicated dynamic behaviors. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the price adjustment speed increases, and the system eventually becomes chaotic via flip bifurcation. Moreover, the time-delayed feedback control is used to force the system back to stability.
format Article
id doaj-art-cbf4b74f845a455db8540bcb05eed8eb
institution OA Journals
issn 1026-0226
1607-887X
language English
publishDate 2021-01-01
publisher Wiley
record_format Article
series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
spelling doaj-art-cbf4b74f845a455db8540bcb05eed8eb2025-08-20T02:19:57ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/39853673985367Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance MarketLongfei Wei0Haiwei Wang1Jing Wang2Jialong Hou3School of Finance, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, ChinaThe Collaborative Innovation Center, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, ChinaSchool of Mathematics, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian 116029, ChinaDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville 32603, Florida, USAThis paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of two sequential-move games, public leadership, and private leadership games. Numerical simulations present complicated dynamic behaviors. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the price adjustment speed increases, and the system eventually becomes chaotic via flip bifurcation. Moreover, the time-delayed feedback control is used to force the system back to stability.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/3985367
spellingShingle Longfei Wei
Haiwei Wang
Jing Wang
Jialong Hou
Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market
title_full Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market
title_fullStr Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market
title_full_unstemmed Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market
title_short Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market
title_sort dynamics and stability analysis of a stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in insurance market
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/3985367
work_keys_str_mv AT longfeiwei dynamicsandstabilityanalysisofastackelbergmixedduopolygamewithpricecompetitionininsurancemarket
AT haiweiwang dynamicsandstabilityanalysisofastackelbergmixedduopolygamewithpricecompetitionininsurancemarket
AT jingwang dynamicsandstabilityanalysisofastackelbergmixedduopolygamewithpricecompetitionininsurancemarket
AT jialonghou dynamicsandstabilityanalysisofastackelbergmixedduopolygamewithpricecompetitionininsurancemarket