Moral and Moorean Incoherencies
It has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering ‘murder is wrong’ invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning th...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Michigan Publishing
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4665/ |
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| author | Andres Soria Ruiz Nils Franzén |
| author_facet | Andres Soria Ruiz Nils Franzén |
| author_sort | Andres Soria Ruiz |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | It has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering ‘murder is wrong’ invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning this phenomenon. We assess the acceptability of constructions in which that inference is explicitly canceled, such as ‘murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it’; and we compare them to similar constructions involving ‘think’ instead of ‘disapprove’—that is, Moore paradoxes (‘murder is wrong but I don’t think that it is wrong’). Our results indicate that the former type of constructions are largely infelicitous, although not as infelicitous as their Moorean counterparts. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-cb75d128bed64efb8b0972e5d59f8001 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-cb75d128bed64efb8b0972e5d59f80012025-08-20T02:43:43ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142023-11-0110010.3998/ergo.4665Moral and Moorean IncoherenciesAndres Soria Ruiz0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4592-9783Nils Franzén1Philosophy, University of BarcelonaUmeå UniversityIt has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering ‘murder is wrong’ invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning this phenomenon. We assess the acceptability of constructions in which that inference is explicitly canceled, such as ‘murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it’; and we compare them to similar constructions involving ‘think’ instead of ‘disapprove’—that is, Moore paradoxes (‘murder is wrong but I don’t think that it is wrong’). Our results indicate that the former type of constructions are largely infelicitous, although not as infelicitous as their Moorean counterparts.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4665/ |
| spellingShingle | Andres Soria Ruiz Nils Franzén Moral and Moorean Incoherencies Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| title | Moral and Moorean Incoherencies |
| title_full | Moral and Moorean Incoherencies |
| title_fullStr | Moral and Moorean Incoherencies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral and Moorean Incoherencies |
| title_short | Moral and Moorean Incoherencies |
| title_sort | moral and moorean incoherencies |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4665/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT andressoriaruiz moralandmooreanincoherencies AT nilsfranzen moralandmooreanincoherencies |