Is Kantian Ethics Morally Alienating? Comments on Mudd
Kant’s philosophy is notoriously based on the dichotomy between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. This dichotomy digs a rift across human nature by separating the animal and the rational parts of it, its heteronomous and autonomous components, duty and self-love. Such a dichotomy, according to...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2023-12-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.publicreason.ro/pdfa/174 |
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| Summary: | Kant’s philosophy is notoriously based on the dichotomy between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. This dichotomy digs a rift across human nature by separating the animal and the rational parts of it, its heteronomous and autonomous components, duty and self-love. Such a dichotomy, according to Sasha Mudd, apparently gives rise to two forms of alienation: moral alienation and practical alienation. On Mudd’s account, Kant successfully escapes the first kind of alienation through his doctrine of respect. Here I argue, contra Mudd, that there are at least two ways in which Kant leaves moral agents morally alienated, i.e., alienated from important dimensions of morality itself.
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| ISSN: | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |