ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY

The fundamental issue regarding Arcesilaus’ skepticism is whether it should be understood as a philosophical position or as a strictly dialectical practice with no doctrinal content. In this paper I argue that it is both by providing an account of the epistemic principles informing his practice alon...

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Main Author: Harald Thorsrud
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: ILIESI 2018-12-01
Series:Lexicon Philosophicum
Online Access:https://lexicon.cnr.it/ojs/index.php/LP/article/view/568
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author Harald Thorsrud
author_facet Harald Thorsrud
author_sort Harald Thorsrud
collection DOAJ
description The fundamental issue regarding Arcesilaus’ skepticism is whether it should be understood as a philosophical position or as a strictly dialectical practice with no doctrinal content. In this paper I argue that it is both by providing an account of the epistemic principles informing his practice along with a positive doxastic attitude that he may consistently take towards those principles. I further show how Arcesilaus may have reasonably derived his Socratic project, including the epistemic principles and his distinctive cognitive attitude, from his reading of Plato’s dialogues, and that this approach enables us to better understand the function of his practical criterion, the reasonable (to eulogon). And finally, I note that since Arcesilaus’ great successor Carneades confronts the same problem regarding the coherence of his Socratic project, a similar interpretative approach may be taken to his practical criterion, the persuasive (to pithanon).
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spelling doaj-art-ca81dbfdb0ba4c61b5d960b5ab61c7982025-08-20T02:52:12ZdeuILIESILexicon Philosophicum2283-78332018-12-0110.19283/lph-2018.568ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMYHarald ThorsrudThe fundamental issue regarding Arcesilaus’ skepticism is whether it should be understood as a philosophical position or as a strictly dialectical practice with no doctrinal content. In this paper I argue that it is both by providing an account of the epistemic principles informing his practice along with a positive doxastic attitude that he may consistently take towards those principles. I further show how Arcesilaus may have reasonably derived his Socratic project, including the epistemic principles and his distinctive cognitive attitude, from his reading of Plato’s dialogues, and that this approach enables us to better understand the function of his practical criterion, the reasonable (to eulogon). And finally, I note that since Arcesilaus’ great successor Carneades confronts the same problem regarding the coherence of his Socratic project, a similar interpretative approach may be taken to his practical criterion, the persuasive (to pithanon). https://lexicon.cnr.it/ojs/index.php/LP/article/view/568
spellingShingle Harald Thorsrud
ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY
Lexicon Philosophicum
title ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY
title_full ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY
title_fullStr ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY
title_full_unstemmed ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY
title_short ARCESILAUS: SOCRATIC SKEPTICISM IN PLATO’S ACADEMY
title_sort arcesilaus socratic skepticism in plato s academy
url https://lexicon.cnr.it/ojs/index.php/LP/article/view/568
work_keys_str_mv AT haraldthorsrud arcesilaussocraticskepticisminplatosacademy