Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?

Numerous studies show that properly designed economic sanctions can force the target to refrain from violating international norms. However, policymakers cannot integrate this finding into their ex ante assessments of whether more forceful coercive measures could prevent military coups, human rights...

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Main Authors: Thies Niemeier, Gerald Schneider
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2024-08-01
Series:Research & Politics
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680241272668
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author Thies Niemeier
Gerald Schneider
author_facet Thies Niemeier
Gerald Schneider
author_sort Thies Niemeier
collection DOAJ
description Numerous studies show that properly designed economic sanctions can force the target to refrain from violating international norms. However, policymakers cannot integrate this finding into their ex ante assessments of whether more forceful coercive measures could prevent military coups, human rights violations, or a war of aggression such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article, we address this shortcoming and introduce counterfactual predictions to answer the what-if question of whether adequate sanctions by the European Union and the United States could have provoked targets to abandon severe norm violations. To this end, a training data set from 1989 to 2008 is used to predict the success of sanctions from 2009 to 2015. Our policy counterfactuals for key sanction cases suggest that stricter EU coercion against Russia after the annexation of Crimea could have triggered policy concessions from the regime of President Putin.
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spelling doaj-art-c8bea479033d44438ce4fa98563b77b92025-08-20T01:55:15ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802024-08-011110.1177/20531680241272668Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?Thies NiemeierGerald SchneiderNumerous studies show that properly designed economic sanctions can force the target to refrain from violating international norms. However, policymakers cannot integrate this finding into their ex ante assessments of whether more forceful coercive measures could prevent military coups, human rights violations, or a war of aggression such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article, we address this shortcoming and introduce counterfactual predictions to answer the what-if question of whether adequate sanctions by the European Union and the United States could have provoked targets to abandon severe norm violations. To this end, a training data set from 1989 to 2008 is used to predict the success of sanctions from 2009 to 2015. Our policy counterfactuals for key sanction cases suggest that stricter EU coercion against Russia after the annexation of Crimea could have triggered policy concessions from the regime of President Putin.https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680241272668
spellingShingle Thies Niemeier
Gerald Schneider
Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?
Research & Politics
title Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?
title_full Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?
title_fullStr Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?
title_full_unstemmed Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?
title_short Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?
title_sort counterfactual coercion could harsher sanctions against russia have prevented the worst
url https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680241272668
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