Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit
This paper analyzes government subsidies based on the service design (i.e., headway) and fare structures of an urban rail transit system while considering necessary financial support from the government. To capture the interactions among the operator performance, government subsidies, and passengers...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Advanced Transportation |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6659384 |
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| author | Qing Wang Paul Schonfeld Lianbo Deng |
| author_facet | Qing Wang Paul Schonfeld Lianbo Deng |
| author_sort | Qing Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper analyzes government subsidies based on the service design (i.e., headway) and fare structures of an urban rail transit system while considering necessary financial support from the government. To capture the interactions among the operator performance, government subsidies, and passengers in an urban rail transit system, a profit maximization model with nonnegative profit constraint is formulated to determine the optimal fare and headway solutions. Then, the social welfare that results from the operator profit maximization model is analyzed. Finally, a numerical example from Changsha, China, is employed to verify the feasibility of the proposed model. The major results consist of optimized solutions for decision variables, i.e., the fares and train headways, as well as subsidies to the operator. The fare elasticity factor under two fare structures significantly affects fares and demand. As the fare elasticity factor increases, the social welfare gradually decreases and a deficit occurs at low fares and demand, while subsidies rise from 0 to ¥24658.00 and ¥38089.16 under the flat fare and distance-based fare structures. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-c8bccb7c9d29448e98eee10b9392c6c1 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0197-6729 2042-3195 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Advanced Transportation |
| spelling | doaj-art-c8bccb7c9d29448e98eee10b9392c6c12025-02-03T06:05:35ZengWileyJournal of Advanced Transportation0197-67292042-31952021-01-01202110.1155/2021/66593846659384Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail TransitQing Wang0Paul Schonfeld1Lianbo Deng2School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Rail Data Research and Application Key Laboratory of Hunan Province, Central South University, Changsha 410075, ChinaDepartment of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park 1173 Glenn Martin Hall, College Park, MD 20742, USASchool of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Rail Data Research and Application Key Laboratory of Hunan Province, Central South University, Changsha 410075, ChinaThis paper analyzes government subsidies based on the service design (i.e., headway) and fare structures of an urban rail transit system while considering necessary financial support from the government. To capture the interactions among the operator performance, government subsidies, and passengers in an urban rail transit system, a profit maximization model with nonnegative profit constraint is formulated to determine the optimal fare and headway solutions. Then, the social welfare that results from the operator profit maximization model is analyzed. Finally, a numerical example from Changsha, China, is employed to verify the feasibility of the proposed model. The major results consist of optimized solutions for decision variables, i.e., the fares and train headways, as well as subsidies to the operator. The fare elasticity factor under two fare structures significantly affects fares and demand. As the fare elasticity factor increases, the social welfare gradually decreases and a deficit occurs at low fares and demand, while subsidies rise from 0 to ¥24658.00 and ¥38089.16 under the flat fare and distance-based fare structures.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6659384 |
| spellingShingle | Qing Wang Paul Schonfeld Lianbo Deng Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit Journal of Advanced Transportation |
| title | Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit |
| title_full | Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit |
| title_fullStr | Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit |
| title_full_unstemmed | Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit |
| title_short | Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit |
| title_sort | profit maximization model with fare structures and subsidy constraints for urban rail transit |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6659384 |
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