Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency

This article examines the challenges of command in counterinsurgency through the British experience in Basra, Iraq (2006–2007). It argues that command is shaped less by individual leaders than by structural and temporal constraints inherent in the strategic culture of liberal states. Using a qualit...

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Main Author: Warren Anthony Chin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova” 2025-08-01
Series:Revista Científica General José María Córdova
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Online Access:https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/1556
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author Warren Anthony Chin
author_facet Warren Anthony Chin
author_sort Warren Anthony Chin
collection DOAJ
description This article examines the challenges of command in counterinsurgency through the British experience in Basra, Iraq (2006–2007). It argues that command is shaped less by individual leaders than by structural and temporal constraints inherent in the strategic culture of liberal states. Using a qualitative case study and the conceptual lenses of “wartime” and “high modern utopianism,” the paper analyses command during Operation Sinbad. The analysis finds that a temporal paradox—pitting the long-term requirements of insurgency against short-term political timelines—fundamentally undermined the mission. This contradiction led to resource shortfalls and institutional fragmentation that crippled the “comprehensive approach”. The paper concludes that tactical actions, however skilful, cannot overcome the institutional pathologies defining how Western states prosecute such wars.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1900-6586
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language English
publishDate 2025-08-01
publisher Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova”
record_format Article
series Revista Científica General José María Córdova
spelling doaj-art-c6c0bfe4c1c84b468ae3ddbaaaafedc72025-08-20T04:02:41ZengEscuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova”Revista Científica General José María Córdova1900-65862500-76452025-08-01235110.21830/19006586.1556Command in Twenty-First Century CounterinsurgencyWarren Anthony Chin0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8876-5259Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates This article examines the challenges of command in counterinsurgency through the British experience in Basra, Iraq (2006–2007). It argues that command is shaped less by individual leaders than by structural and temporal constraints inherent in the strategic culture of liberal states. Using a qualitative case study and the conceptual lenses of “wartime” and “high modern utopianism,” the paper analyses command during Operation Sinbad. The analysis finds that a temporal paradox—pitting the long-term requirements of insurgency against short-term political timelines—fundamentally undermined the mission. This contradiction led to resource shortfalls and institutional fragmentation that crippled the “comprehensive approach”. The paper concludes that tactical actions, however skilful, cannot overcome the institutional pathologies defining how Western states prosecute such wars. https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/1556CommandcounterinsurgencyBritish ArmyIraq WarOperation Sinbadmilitary leadership
spellingShingle Warren Anthony Chin
Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency
Revista Científica General José María Córdova
Command
counterinsurgency
British Army
Iraq War
Operation Sinbad
military leadership
title Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency
title_full Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency
title_fullStr Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency
title_full_unstemmed Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency
title_short Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency
title_sort command in twenty first century counterinsurgency
topic Command
counterinsurgency
British Army
Iraq War
Operation Sinbad
military leadership
url https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/1556
work_keys_str_mv AT warrenanthonychin commandintwentyfirstcenturycounterinsurgency