Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach

This paper investigates Mean Field Game methods to solve missile interception strategies in three-dimensional space, with a focus on analyzing the pursuit–evasion problem in many-to-many scenarios. By extending traditional missile interception models, an efficient solution is proposed to avoid dimen...

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Main Authors: Yu Bai, Di Zhou, Zhen He
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2025-04-01
Series:Aerospace
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Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/12/4/302
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author Yu Bai
Di Zhou
Zhen He
author_facet Yu Bai
Di Zhou
Zhen He
author_sort Yu Bai
collection DOAJ
description This paper investigates Mean Field Game methods to solve missile interception strategies in three-dimensional space, with a focus on analyzing the pursuit–evasion problem in many-to-many scenarios. By extending traditional missile interception models, an efficient solution is proposed to avoid dimensional explosion and communication burdens, particularly for large-scale, multi-missile systems. The paper presents a system of stochastic differential equations with control constraints, describing the motion dynamics between the missile (pursuer) and the target (evader), and defines the associated cost function, considering proximity group distributions with other missiles and targets. Next, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for the pursuers and evaders are derived, and the uniqueness of the distributional solution is proved. Furthermore, using the <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mi>ϵ</mi></semantics></math></inline-formula>-Nash equilibrium framework, it is demonstrated that, under the MFG model, participants can deviate from the optimal strategy within a certain tolerance, while still minimizing the cost. Finally, the paper summarizes the derivation process of the optimal strategy and proves that, under reasonable assumptions, the system can achieve a uniquely stable equilibrium, ensuring the stability of the strategies and distributions of both the pursuers and evaders. The research provides a scalable solution to high-risk, multi-agent control problems, with significant practical applications, particularly in fields such as missile defense systems.
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spelling doaj-art-c56a6bad13f84e60a085e215083160ff2025-08-20T02:24:39ZengMDPI AGAerospace2226-43102025-04-0112430210.3390/aerospace12040302Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game ApproachYu Bai0Di Zhou1Zhen He2School of Astronautics, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Astronautics, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Astronautics, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaThis paper investigates Mean Field Game methods to solve missile interception strategies in three-dimensional space, with a focus on analyzing the pursuit–evasion problem in many-to-many scenarios. By extending traditional missile interception models, an efficient solution is proposed to avoid dimensional explosion and communication burdens, particularly for large-scale, multi-missile systems. The paper presents a system of stochastic differential equations with control constraints, describing the motion dynamics between the missile (pursuer) and the target (evader), and defines the associated cost function, considering proximity group distributions with other missiles and targets. Next, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for the pursuers and evaders are derived, and the uniqueness of the distributional solution is proved. Furthermore, using the <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mi>ϵ</mi></semantics></math></inline-formula>-Nash equilibrium framework, it is demonstrated that, under the MFG model, participants can deviate from the optimal strategy within a certain tolerance, while still minimizing the cost. Finally, the paper summarizes the derivation process of the optimal strategy and proves that, under reasonable assumptions, the system can achieve a uniquely stable equilibrium, ensuring the stability of the strategies and distributions of both the pursuers and evaders. The research provides a scalable solution to high-risk, multi-agent control problems, with significant practical applications, particularly in fields such as missile defense systems.https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/12/4/302mean field gamesmissile interceptionforward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs)<i>ϵ</i>-Nash equilibrium
spellingShingle Yu Bai
Di Zhou
Zhen He
Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach
Aerospace
mean field games
missile interception
forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs)
<i>ϵ</i>-Nash equilibrium
title Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach
title_full Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach
title_fullStr Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach
title_short Optimal Pursuit Strategies in Missile Interception: Mean Field Game Approach
title_sort optimal pursuit strategies in missile interception mean field game approach
topic mean field games
missile interception
forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs)
<i>ϵ</i>-Nash equilibrium
url https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/12/4/302
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