Stochastic games of parental vaccination decision making and bounded rationality
Vaccination is an effective strategy to prevent the spread of diseases. However, hesitancy and rejection of vaccines, particularly in childhood immunizations, pose challenges to vaccination efforts. In that case, according to rational decision-making and classical utility theory, parents weigh the c...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
AIMS Press
2025-02-01
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| Series: | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2025014 |
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| Summary: | Vaccination is an effective strategy to prevent the spread of diseases. However, hesitancy and rejection of vaccines, particularly in childhood immunizations, pose challenges to vaccination efforts. In that case, according to rational decision-making and classical utility theory, parents weigh the costs of vaccination against the costs of not vaccinating their children. Social norms influence these parental decision-making outcomes, deviating their decisions from rationality. Additionally, variability in values of utilities stemming from stochasticity in parents' perceptions over time can lead to further deviations from rationality. In this paper, we employ independent white noises to represent stochastic fluctuations in parental perceptions of utility functions of the decisions over time, as well as in the disease transmission rates. This approach leads to a system of stochastic differential Eqs of a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model coupled with a stochastic replicator Eq. We explore the dynamics of these Eqs and identify new behaviors emerging from stochastic influences. Interestingly, incorporating stochasticity into the utility functions for vaccination and nonvaccination leads to a decision-making model that reflects the bounded rationality of humans. Noise, like social norms, is a two-sided sword that depends on the degree of bounded rationality of each group. We also perform a stochastic optimal control as a discount to the cost of vaccination to counteract bounded rationality. |
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| ISSN: | 1551-0018 |