KNOWLEDGE-HOW, ABILITY, AND COUNTERFACTUAL SUCCESS. A STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION
The paper is thematically divided into two parts. In the first part, we will address the arguments raised against the anti-intellectualist thesis that ability is a necessary condition for knowledge-how, present Katherine Hawley’s proposed generic solution based on counterfactual success in order to...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Babeș-Bolyai University
2020-08-01
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| Series: | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/2682 |
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| Summary: | The paper is thematically divided into two parts. In the first part, we will address the arguments raised against the anti-intellectualist thesis that ability is a necessary condition for knowledge-how, present Katherine Hawley’s proposed generic solution based on counterfactual success in order to overcome these arguments, followed by an analysis of Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument to Hawley’s counterfactual success thesis [CST]. We will conclude that Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument misses its target, so that, as far as we are concerned, Katherine Hawley’s proposal, namely CST, is safe. In the second part of the paper, we will provide a statistical interpretation of one of Hawley’s more specific proposals, counterfactual success with occasional failure [CSTF], and assess a couple of philosophically challenging consequences that follow from such an interpretation.
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| ISSN: | 2065-9407 |