Bertrand Game with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concern
The classical Bertrand game is assumed that players are perfectly rational. However, many empirical researches indicate that people have bounded rational behavior with fairness concern, which is important in the two-person game and has attracted much attention. In this paper, fairness concern is inc...
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| Main Authors: | Wentao Yi, Chunqiao Tan |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2019-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1253092 |
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