(Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia
Humans need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being taken advantage of. Too much caution out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce false beliefs of intended harm. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind....
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Ubiquity Press
2024-09-01
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| Series: | Computational Psychiatry |
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| Online Access: | https://account.cpsyjournal.org/index.php/up-j-cp/article/view/117 |
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| author | Nitay Alon Lion Schulz Vaughan Bell Michael Moutoussis Peter Dayan Joseph M. Barnby |
| author_facet | Nitay Alon Lion Schulz Vaughan Bell Michael Moutoussis Peter Dayan Joseph M. Barnby |
| author_sort | Nitay Alon |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Humans need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being taken advantage of. Too much caution out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce false beliefs of intended harm. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind. We simulate agents of different depths of mentalizing within a simple game theoretic paradigm and show how, if aligned well, deep recursive mentalization gives rise to both successful deception as well as reasonable skepticism. However, we also show that if a self is mentalizing too deeply – hyper-mentalizing – false beliefs arise that a partner is trying to trick them maliciously, resulting in a material loss to the self. Importantly, we show that this is only true when hypermentalizing agents believe observed actions are generated intentionally. This theory offers a potential cognitive mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial ideation. Rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may arise from the application of overly strategic thinking to ingenuous behaviour. Author Summary Interacting competitively requires vigilance to avoid deception. However, excessive caution can have adverse effects, stemming from false beliefs of intentional harm. So far there is no formal cognitive account of what may cause this suspiciousness. Here we present an examination of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind – the cognitive ability to consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others. By simulating interacting computer agents we illustrate how well-aligned agents can give rise to successful deception and justified skepticism. Crucially, we also reveal that overly cautious agents develop false beliefs that an ingenuous partner is attempting malicious trickery, leading to tangible losses. As well as formally defining a plausible mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial thinking, our theory indicates that rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may involve an over-application of strategy to genuine behaviour. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-c106a91b19244941bc80b95d3e4e7c73 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2379-6227 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-09-01 |
| publisher | Ubiquity Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Computational Psychiatry |
| spelling | doaj-art-c106a91b19244941bc80b95d3e4e7c732025-08-20T01:47:38ZengUbiquity PressComputational Psychiatry2379-62272024-09-0181159–177159–17710.5334/cpsy.11794(Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to ParanoiaNitay Alon0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2698-3573Lion Schulz1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1841-1273Vaughan Bell2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8616-4847Michael Moutoussis3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4751-0425Peter Dayan4https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3476-1839Joseph M. Barnby5https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6002-1362Department of Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, IL; Department of Computational Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, TübingenDepartment of Computational Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, TübingenClinical, Educational, and Health Psychology, University College LondonDepartment of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, LondonDepartment of Computational Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen; Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, TübingenDepartment of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, London, UK; School of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, The University of Western AustraliaHumans need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being taken advantage of. Too much caution out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce false beliefs of intended harm. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind. We simulate agents of different depths of mentalizing within a simple game theoretic paradigm and show how, if aligned well, deep recursive mentalization gives rise to both successful deception as well as reasonable skepticism. However, we also show that if a self is mentalizing too deeply – hyper-mentalizing – false beliefs arise that a partner is trying to trick them maliciously, resulting in a material loss to the self. Importantly, we show that this is only true when hypermentalizing agents believe observed actions are generated intentionally. This theory offers a potential cognitive mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial ideation. Rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may arise from the application of overly strategic thinking to ingenuous behaviour. Author Summary Interacting competitively requires vigilance to avoid deception. However, excessive caution can have adverse effects, stemming from false beliefs of intentional harm. So far there is no formal cognitive account of what may cause this suspiciousness. Here we present an examination of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind – the cognitive ability to consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others. By simulating interacting computer agents we illustrate how well-aligned agents can give rise to successful deception and justified skepticism. Crucially, we also reveal that overly cautious agents develop false beliefs that an ingenuous partner is attempting malicious trickery, leading to tangible losses. As well as formally defining a plausible mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial thinking, our theory indicates that rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may involve an over-application of strategy to genuine behaviour.https://account.cpsyjournal.org/index.php/up-j-cp/article/view/117theory of mindparanoid delusionsparanoiaemergence of paranoid behavioircomputational psychiatrycomputational modelbayesian brain |
| spellingShingle | Nitay Alon Lion Schulz Vaughan Bell Michael Moutoussis Peter Dayan Joseph M. Barnby (Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia Computational Psychiatry theory of mind paranoid delusions paranoia emergence of paranoid behavioir computational psychiatry computational model bayesian brain |
| title | (Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia |
| title_full | (Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia |
| title_fullStr | (Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia |
| title_full_unstemmed | (Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia |
| title_short | (Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia |
| title_sort | mal adaptive mentalizing in the cognitive hierarchy and its link to paranoia |
| topic | theory of mind paranoid delusions paranoia emergence of paranoid behavioir computational psychiatry computational model bayesian brain |
| url | https://account.cpsyjournal.org/index.php/up-j-cp/article/view/117 |
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