Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations

Against the background of the goal of “carbon peak and carbon neutrality”, it will be inevitable to form multi-agent cooperative alliance between pumped storage stations, wind power stations, and photovoltaic power stations driven by interests. However, the form of multi-agent cooperative alliance i...

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Main Author: DUAN Shaowei, CAI Ye, TANG Xiafei, TANG Liang, TAN Yudong
Format: Article
Language:zho
Published: Editorial Department of Electric Power Construction 2025-03-01
Series:Dianli jianshe
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Online Access:https://www.cepc.com.cn/fileup/1000-7229/PDF/1740549133305-596939930.pdf
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author DUAN Shaowei, CAI Ye, TANG Xiafei, TANG Liang, TAN Yudong
author_facet DUAN Shaowei, CAI Ye, TANG Xiafei, TANG Liang, TAN Yudong
author_sort DUAN Shaowei, CAI Ye, TANG Xiafei, TANG Liang, TAN Yudong
collection DOAJ
description Against the background of the goal of “carbon peak and carbon neutrality”, it will be inevitable to form multi-agent cooperative alliance between pumped storage stations, wind power stations, and photovoltaic power stations driven by interests. However, the form of multi-agent cooperative alliance is not static and may break down during the evolution process. Evolutionary games are commonly used to study the cooperative operation of entities in the electricity market, so it can be used to study the long-term stability of cooperative alliances. However, as a non completely rational game method, it ignores the complexity and randomness of the game process. This article constructed a benefit coordination model based on evolutionary game theory, optimized the output of each agents, and solves the evolutionary game benefit matrix. Then, this article constructed tripartite determine evolutionary game model and stochastic evolutionary game model of wind power stations, solar power stations and pumped storage stations, revealing the mechanism of the formation and rupture of multi-agent cooperative alliance. Based on actual data from a certain province, this article concludes that it is feasible for pumped storage stations to participate as entities in the cooperative alliance in the future, and the cooperative alliance can be divided into initial stage, development stage, and rupture stage according to the proportion of new energy installed capacity; Under the influence of random interference factors, there is a possibility for solar power stations to withdraw from the alliance in advance; The stable cooperative alliance has shown excellent performance in ensuring the consumption of new energy. The above conclusions provide theoretical support for the participation of pumped storage power stations in profit oriented cooperative alliances, and provide direction for power grid companies to maintain the stability of cooperative alliances.
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spelling doaj-art-c098b35d70ab49f2abe3e330ba1d61c92025-08-20T03:04:54ZzhoEditorial Department of Electric Power ConstructionDianli jianshe1000-72292025-03-0146310411510.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2025.03.009Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power StationsDUAN Shaowei, CAI Ye, TANG Xiafei, TANG Liang, TAN Yudong01. State Key Laboratory of Disaster Prevention & Reduction for Power Grid(Changsha University of Science and Technology),Changsha 410114, China;2. Economic and Technical Research Institute of State Grid Hunan Electric Power Co., Ltd.,Changsha 410004, China;3. Hunan Key Laboratory of Energy Internet Supply-Demand and Operation,Changsha 410004, ChinaAgainst the background of the goal of “carbon peak and carbon neutrality”, it will be inevitable to form multi-agent cooperative alliance between pumped storage stations, wind power stations, and photovoltaic power stations driven by interests. However, the form of multi-agent cooperative alliance is not static and may break down during the evolution process. Evolutionary games are commonly used to study the cooperative operation of entities in the electricity market, so it can be used to study the long-term stability of cooperative alliances. However, as a non completely rational game method, it ignores the complexity and randomness of the game process. This article constructed a benefit coordination model based on evolutionary game theory, optimized the output of each agents, and solves the evolutionary game benefit matrix. Then, this article constructed tripartite determine evolutionary game model and stochastic evolutionary game model of wind power stations, solar power stations and pumped storage stations, revealing the mechanism of the formation and rupture of multi-agent cooperative alliance. Based on actual data from a certain province, this article concludes that it is feasible for pumped storage stations to participate as entities in the cooperative alliance in the future, and the cooperative alliance can be divided into initial stage, development stage, and rupture stage according to the proportion of new energy installed capacity; Under the influence of random interference factors, there is a possibility for solar power stations to withdraw from the alliance in advance; The stable cooperative alliance has shown excellent performance in ensuring the consumption of new energy. The above conclusions provide theoretical support for the participation of pumped storage power stations in profit oriented cooperative alliances, and provide direction for power grid companies to maintain the stability of cooperative alliances.https://www.cepc.com.cn/fileup/1000-7229/PDF/1740549133305-596939930.pdfpumped storage station|evolutionary game|cooperative alliance|benefit coordination
spellingShingle DUAN Shaowei, CAI Ye, TANG Xiafei, TANG Liang, TAN Yudong
Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations
Dianli jianshe
pumped storage station|evolutionary game|cooperative alliance|benefit coordination
title Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations
title_full Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations
title_fullStr Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations
title_full_unstemmed Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations
title_short Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis Considering Multi-Agent Cooperation Between Pumped Storage Station and Wind-Solar Power Stations
title_sort research on tripartite evolutionary game and stability analysis considering multi agent cooperation between pumped storage station and wind solar power stations
topic pumped storage station|evolutionary game|cooperative alliance|benefit coordination
url https://www.cepc.com.cn/fileup/1000-7229/PDF/1740549133305-596939930.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT duanshaoweicaiyetangxiafeitangliangtanyudong researchontripartiteevolutionarygameandstabilityanalysisconsideringmultiagentcooperationbetweenpumpedstoragestationandwindsolarpowerstations