Legislative Cooperation and Selective Benefits: An Experimental Investigation on the Limits of Credit Claiming
Do legislators get credit for working with the other party? Studies on this have been limited due to a lack of an appropriate counterfactual. This article experimentally estimates the value of credit claiming on a small project that was produced with bipartisanship or with an uncooperative party. I...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Taylor & Francis Group
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Statistics and Public Policy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/2330443X.2024.2358887 |
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| Summary: | Do legislators get credit for working with the other party? Studies on this have been limited due to a lack of an appropriate counterfactual. This article experimentally estimates the value of credit claiming on a small project that was produced with bipartisanship or with an uncooperative party. I argue that process does indeed matter. Specifically, I hypothesize voters will punish in-party partisans for working with the other side and punish out-party partisans when they do not work with their side. However, in-party partisans do not care whether their party works with the other side. Out-party partisans punish members for uncooperative legislating. Further, I argue and find that these effects are distinguishable from overall partisan effects, demonstrating that members can use distributional projects to gain out-party support in a polarized environment. These findings have important implications for lawmaking and polarization. |
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| ISSN: | 2330-443X |