Signalling chains with probe and adjust learning
Many models explain the evolution of signalling in repeated stage games on social networks, differently in this study each signalling game evolves a communication strategy to transmit information across the network. Specifically, I formalise signalling chain games as a generalisation of Lewis'...
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| Main Author: | Giorgio Gosti |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis Group
2018-04-01
|
| Series: | Connection Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540091.2017.1345858 |
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