Signalling chains with probe and adjust learning
Many models explain the evolution of signalling in repeated stage games on social networks, differently in this study each signalling game evolves a communication strategy to transmit information across the network. Specifically, I formalise signalling chain games as a generalisation of Lewis'...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Taylor & Francis Group
2018-04-01
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| Series: | Connection Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540091.2017.1345858 |
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| Summary: | Many models explain the evolution of signalling in repeated stage games on social networks, differently in this study each signalling game evolves a communication strategy to transmit information across the network. Specifically, I formalise signalling chain games as a generalisation of Lewis' signalling games, where a number of players are placed on a chain network and play a signalling game in which they have to propagate information across the network. I show that probe and adjust learning allows the system to develop communication conventions, but it may temporarily perturb the system out of conventions. Through simulations, I evaluate how long the system takes to evolve a signalling convention and the amount of time it stays in it. This discussion presents a mechanism in which simple players can evolve signalling across a social network without necessarily understanding the entire system. |
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| ISSN: | 0954-0091 1360-0494 |