The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems
Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral v...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2013-01-01
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| Series: | The Scientific World Journal |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/653035 |
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| author | Maria Gallego Norman Schofield |
| author_facet | Maria Gallego Norman Schofield |
| author_sort | Maria Gallego |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves
at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c. It has been shown that high values of c imply that there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. We used electoral surveys to construct a stochastic valence model of the the elections in various countries. We find that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries with similar regimes, and across political regimes. In some countries, the centripetal tendency leads parties to converge to the electoral mean. In others the centrifugal tendency dominates and some parties locate far from the electoral mean. In particular, for countries with proportional electoral systems, namely, Israel, Turkey, and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and Great Britain, the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-b85ea3adaa8946488bca100939f44a72 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1537-744X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2013-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | The Scientific World Journal |
| spelling | doaj-art-b85ea3adaa8946488bca100939f44a722025-02-03T01:32:49ZengWileyThe Scientific World Journal1537-744X2013-01-01201310.1155/2013/653035653035The Convergence Coefficient across Political SystemsMaria Gallego0Norman Schofield1Center in Political Economy, Washington University, 1 Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO 63130, USACenter in Political Economy, Washington University, 1 Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO 63130, USAFormal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c. It has been shown that high values of c imply that there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. We used electoral surveys to construct a stochastic valence model of the the elections in various countries. We find that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries with similar regimes, and across political regimes. In some countries, the centripetal tendency leads parties to converge to the electoral mean. In others the centrifugal tendency dominates and some parties locate far from the electoral mean. In particular, for countries with proportional electoral systems, namely, Israel, Turkey, and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and Great Britain, the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/653035 |
| spellingShingle | Maria Gallego Norman Schofield The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems The Scientific World Journal |
| title | The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems |
| title_full | The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems |
| title_fullStr | The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems |
| title_short | The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems |
| title_sort | convergence coefficient across political systems |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/653035 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mariagallego theconvergencecoefficientacrosspoliticalsystems AT normanschofield theconvergencecoefficientacrosspoliticalsystems AT mariagallego convergencecoefficientacrosspoliticalsystems AT normanschofield convergencecoefficientacrosspoliticalsystems |