Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness
The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized with...
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Main Authors: | Liangjie Xia, Longfei He |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2014-01-01
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Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/837376 |
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