Game Theory-Based Analysis of the Relationship between Managers and Shareholders: An Emphasis on Information Disclosure Quality, Audit Quality and Expected Return

Game theory, or interactive decision-making theory, is a mathematical framework that helps predict the outcomes of a group of interacting agents. This research aims to design and describe strategic relations between managers and shareholders through signaling games. The study investigates the conseq...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zahra Moghadam, Hamzeh Didar, Kiumars Shahbazi, Ali Ebadian
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ferdowsi University of Mashhad 2025-04-01
Series:Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
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Online Access:https://ijaaf.um.ac.ir/article_45778_4bcc29d80d95983e2ff464b50c071281.pdf
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Summary:Game theory, or interactive decision-making theory, is a mathematical framework that helps predict the outcomes of a group of interacting agents. This research aims to design and describe strategic relations between managers and shareholders through signaling games. The study investigates the consequences of choosing strategies by managers (high and low quality of information disclosure) and its relationship with the strategies chosen by shareholders (high and low expected return of shareholders) and (high and low quality of audit services) in companies with different levels of internal control establishment. The statistical population of research consists of all companies listed in the Tehran stock exchange market from 2012 to 2021. 114 companies were considered as a statistical sample of research. The study outcomes illustrate that Bayesian Nash equilibrium is established in the strategy (high-quality information disclosure and low expected return) in the strong internal control environment and the strategy (low-quality information disclosure and high expected return) in the weak internal control environment. In these strategies, neither the manager nor the shareholder has the motivation to change the strategy because their benefits will not increase by changing their strategy.
ISSN:2717-4131
2588-6142