Disentangling Facts and Values: an Analysis of Putnam’s Pragmatic Ethics
In several important works in ethics, Hillary Putnam criticizes the traditional fact/value dichotomy, which is based on the Humean question whether ought follows from is. More recently, Putnam even declared the collapse of this dichotomy calling once again for rethinking the last dogma of empiricis...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2013-08-01
|
| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/32914 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | In several important works in ethics, Hillary Putnam criticizes the traditional fact/value dichotomy, which is based on the Humean question whether ought follows from is. More recently, Putnam even declared the collapse of this dichotomy calling once again for rethinking the last dogma of empiricism, namely the positivist creed that facts are objective and values are subjective. The aim of this work is to reassess Putnam’s main arguments to show the entanglement between facts and values. Putnam is right in many of his criticisms, but it is not clear also how he avoids reductionist monistic naturalism, which he considers an “inadequate philosophy”. Using his pragmatic pluralism inspired by Wittgenstein, I will try to show that we have reasons to make a distinction between facts and values.
|
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1808-1711 |