Information, Secrecy, and Falsehood

Can information be false? An important debate in the philosophy of information turns on this seemingly simple question. According to veridicalism (or the veridicality thesis), truth is a necessary condition for information; by contrast, according to non-veridicalism (or the non-veridicality thesis),...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Pierre Le Morvan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SJSU Scholarworks 2025-01-01
Series:Secrecy and Society
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Online Access:https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol3/iss2/7/
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Summary:Can information be false? An important debate in the philosophy of information turns on this seemingly simple question. According to veridicalism (or the veridicality thesis), truth is a necessary condition for information; by contrast, according to non-veridicalism (or the non-veridicality thesis), it is not. I argue that this debate has noteworthy implications for how we should conceive of secrecy understood in terms of concealment of information. I also argue that, since falsehoods can be secret, it is more tenable to hold that secrecy is not restricted to true information than to hold that it is.
ISSN:2377-6188