Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been wide...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Michigan Publishing
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4666/ |
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| _version_ | 1850085458393956352 |
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| author | Carlotta Pavese Paul Henne |
| author_facet | Carlotta Pavese Paul Henne |
| author_sort | Carlotta Pavese |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-adc36fef74a644c8ac34e002689d3721 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-adc36fef74a644c8ac34e002689d37212025-08-20T02:43:43ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142023-11-0110010.3998/ergo.4666Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional ActionCarlotta Pavese0Paul Henne1Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell UniversityDepartment of Philosophy, Lake Forest CollegeEpistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4666/ |
| spellingShingle | Carlotta Pavese Paul Henne Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| title | Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action |
| title_full | Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action |
| title_fullStr | Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action |
| title_short | Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action |
| title_sort | epistemic luck knowledge how and intentional action |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4666/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT carlottapavese epistemicluckknowledgehowandintentionalaction AT paulhenne epistemicluckknowledgehowandintentionalaction |