Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective
With the development of blockchain technology, blockchain-based digital cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have received broad interest. Due to the permissionless environment, the blockchain is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, including the block withholding (BWH) attack. BWH attack is one...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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ELS Publishing (ELSP)
2022-12-01
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| Series: | Blockchain |
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| Online Access: | https://elsp-homepage.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.compaper/journal/open/BC/2024/blockchain20230002.pdf |
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| _version_ | 1849735174327107584 |
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| author | Yukun Cheng Zhanghao Yao Zhiqi Xu Xiaojing Ye |
| author_facet | Yukun Cheng Zhanghao Yao Zhiqi Xu Xiaojing Ye |
| author_sort | Yukun Cheng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the development of blockchain technology, blockchain-based digital cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have received broad interest. Due to the permissionless environment, the blockchain is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, including the block withholding (BWH) attack. BWH attack is one of the common selfish mining attacks, by which the attacking pool infiltrates the attacked pool by sending some infiltrating miners. These infiltrating miners try to find (partial) proof-of-work solutions and share the reward of the attacked pool, but discard the solution that can actually create blocks. Therefore, the attacking pool benefits by withholding blocks from the infiltrating miners, while damaging the benefits of victim pools. In this paper, we introduce the reward reallocation mechanism by paying additional rewards to the miners who successfully mine blocks, and propose an evolutionary game model for BWH attack among pools to study the strategy selection of pools. By constructing the replicator dynamic equations, the evolutionary stable strategies of pools are explored based on different levels of additional rewards. Our results provide enlightening significance to mitigate the negative influence from BWH attacks in practice. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ab85520d77d14b77ba070d41e9b543eb |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2959-1260 2958-8138 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022-12-01 |
| publisher | ELS Publishing (ELSP) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Blockchain |
| spelling | doaj-art-ab85520d77d14b77ba070d41e9b543eb2025-08-20T03:07:37ZengELS Publishing (ELSP)Blockchain2959-12602958-81382022-12-011110.55092/blockchain202300021583270634618396672Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspectiveYukun Cheng0Zhanghao Yao1Zhiqi Xu2Xiaojing Ye3Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, ChinaSuzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, ChinaSuzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, ChinaSuzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, ChinaWith the development of blockchain technology, blockchain-based digital cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have received broad interest. Due to the permissionless environment, the blockchain is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, including the block withholding (BWH) attack. BWH attack is one of the common selfish mining attacks, by which the attacking pool infiltrates the attacked pool by sending some infiltrating miners. These infiltrating miners try to find (partial) proof-of-work solutions and share the reward of the attacked pool, but discard the solution that can actually create blocks. Therefore, the attacking pool benefits by withholding blocks from the infiltrating miners, while damaging the benefits of victim pools. In this paper, we introduce the reward reallocation mechanism by paying additional rewards to the miners who successfully mine blocks, and propose an evolutionary game model for BWH attack among pools to study the strategy selection of pools. By constructing the replicator dynamic equations, the evolutionary stable strategies of pools are explored based on different levels of additional rewards. Our results provide enlightening significance to mitigate the negative influence from BWH attacks in practice.https://elsp-homepage.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.compaper/journal/open/BC/2024/blockchain20230002.pdfblock withholding attackevolutionary gamemitigation measureblockchain |
| spellingShingle | Yukun Cheng Zhanghao Yao Zhiqi Xu Xiaojing Ye Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective Blockchain block withholding attack evolutionary game mitigation measure blockchain |
| title | Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_full | Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_fullStr | Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_short | Equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack: an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_sort | equilibrium analysis of block withholding attack an evolutionary game perspective |
| topic | block withholding attack evolutionary game mitigation measure blockchain |
| url | https://elsp-homepage.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.compaper/journal/open/BC/2024/blockchain20230002.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yukuncheng equilibriumanalysisofblockwithholdingattackanevolutionarygameperspective AT zhanghaoyao equilibriumanalysisofblockwithholdingattackanevolutionarygameperspective AT zhiqixu equilibriumanalysisofblockwithholdingattackanevolutionarygameperspective AT xiaojingye equilibriumanalysisofblockwithholdingattackanevolutionarygameperspective |