Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks
In a wireless sensor network, some nodes may act selfishly and noncooperatively, such as not forwarding packets, in response to their own limited resources. If most of the nodes in a network exhibit this selfish behavior, the entire network will be paralyzed, and it will not be able to provide norma...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2017-01-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Antennas and Propagation |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/8591206 |
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| author | Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Al-Jaoufi Yun Liu Zhen-jiang Zhang Lorna Uden |
| author_facet | Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Al-Jaoufi Yun Liu Zhen-jiang Zhang Lorna Uden |
| author_sort | Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Al-Jaoufi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In a wireless sensor network, some nodes may act selfishly and noncooperatively, such as not forwarding packets, in response to their own limited resources. If most of the nodes in a network exhibit this selfish behavior, the entire network will be paralyzed, and it will not be able to provide normal service. This paper considers implementing the idea of evolutionary game theory into the nodes of wireless sensor networks to effectively improve the reliability and stability of the networks. We present a new model for the selfish node incentive mechanism with a forward game node for wireless sensor networks, and we discuss applications of the replicator dynamics mechanism to analyze evolutionary trends of trust relationships among nodes. We analyzed our approach theoretically and conducted simulations based on the idea of evolutionary game theory. The results of the simulation indicated that a wireless sensor network that uses the incentive mechanism can forward packets well while resisting any slight variations. Thus, the stability and reliability of wireless sensor networks are improved. We conducted numerical experiments, and the results verified our conclusions based on the theoretical analysis. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ab14f34e9bf3469fa58ea05a03a95462 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1687-5869 1687-5877 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | International Journal of Antennas and Propagation |
| spelling | doaj-art-ab14f34e9bf3469fa58ea05a03a954622025-02-03T05:51:29ZengWileyInternational Journal of Antennas and Propagation1687-58691687-58772017-01-01201710.1155/2017/85912068591206Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor NetworksMohammed Ahmed Ahmed Al-Jaoufi0Yun Liu1Zhen-jiang Zhang2Lorna Uden3School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, ChinaSchool of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, ChinaSchool of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, ChinaSchool of Computing and Digital Technologies, Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent ST4 2DE, UKIn a wireless sensor network, some nodes may act selfishly and noncooperatively, such as not forwarding packets, in response to their own limited resources. If most of the nodes in a network exhibit this selfish behavior, the entire network will be paralyzed, and it will not be able to provide normal service. This paper considers implementing the idea of evolutionary game theory into the nodes of wireless sensor networks to effectively improve the reliability and stability of the networks. We present a new model for the selfish node incentive mechanism with a forward game node for wireless sensor networks, and we discuss applications of the replicator dynamics mechanism to analyze evolutionary trends of trust relationships among nodes. We analyzed our approach theoretically and conducted simulations based on the idea of evolutionary game theory. The results of the simulation indicated that a wireless sensor network that uses the incentive mechanism can forward packets well while resisting any slight variations. Thus, the stability and reliability of wireless sensor networks are improved. We conducted numerical experiments, and the results verified our conclusions based on the theoretical analysis.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/8591206 |
| spellingShingle | Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Al-Jaoufi Yun Liu Zhen-jiang Zhang Lorna Uden Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks International Journal of Antennas and Propagation |
| title | Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks |
| title_full | Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks |
| title_fullStr | Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks |
| title_short | Study on Selfish Node Incentive Mechanism with a Forward Game Node in Wireless Sensor Networks |
| title_sort | study on selfish node incentive mechanism with a forward game node in wireless sensor networks |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/8591206 |
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