Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry
With the continuous development of information and communication technology, “software-defined vehicle” has become the trend of the times. The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is becoming a new direction for the development of the automotive industry. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperative inno...
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MDPI AG
2025-02-01
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| Series: | Systems |
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| author | Jinhuan Tang Yiming Chen Dan Zhao Shoufeng Ji |
| author_facet | Jinhuan Tang Yiming Chen Dan Zhao Shoufeng Ji |
| author_sort | Jinhuan Tang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the continuous development of information and communication technology, “software-defined vehicle” has become the trend of the times. The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is becoming a new direction for the development of the automotive industry. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperative innovation in the ICV sector, the dispersal of industrial chain resources, and the absence of enduring and consistent cooperation pose significant obstacles to value co-creation. Therefore, this paper constructs a value co-creation evolutionary game model of the innovation ecosystem of the ICV industry with the automotive enterprise, an intelligent automotive solution provider and the government as players, and applies prospect theory to optimize the tripartite evolutionary game. The payment matrix is established, the expected revenue is analyzed for each player’s strategies, and the replication dynamic equation and evolutionary stability strategy are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation. The aim is to promote value co-creation by analyzing the co-evolution mechanism of various stakeholder strategies in the ICV innovation ecosystem. The results show the following: (1) The best evolutionary stability strategy is the positive cross-border cooperation between the automotive enterprise and the intelligent automotive solution provider, while the government gradually does not provide subsidies. (2) The government’s subsidy support should be controlled within an appropriate range. If the subsidy is too great, the marginal effect of incentives will gradually weaken. (3) The players’ willingness to integrate across borders can be enhanced by a higher level of trust and resource complementarity between the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider. Also, liquidated damages and opportunity loss can effectively prevent the occurrence of negative integration behaviors. (4) The greater the risk attitude coefficient and risk aversion coefficient of the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider, the more conducive they are to the occurrence of positive integration behavior. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-a94f8d3f2bab4c4b86ec6f3204630c34 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2079-8954 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-02-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
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| series | Systems |
| spelling | doaj-art-a94f8d3f2bab4c4b86ec6f3204630c342025-08-20T02:03:30ZengMDPI AGSystems2079-89542025-02-0113212110.3390/systems13020121Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle IndustryJinhuan Tang0Yiming Chen1Dan Zhao2Shoufeng Ji3School of Economics and Management, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang 110136, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang 110136, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan 243032, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, ChinaWith the continuous development of information and communication technology, “software-defined vehicle” has become the trend of the times. The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is becoming a new direction for the development of the automotive industry. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperative innovation in the ICV sector, the dispersal of industrial chain resources, and the absence of enduring and consistent cooperation pose significant obstacles to value co-creation. Therefore, this paper constructs a value co-creation evolutionary game model of the innovation ecosystem of the ICV industry with the automotive enterprise, an intelligent automotive solution provider and the government as players, and applies prospect theory to optimize the tripartite evolutionary game. The payment matrix is established, the expected revenue is analyzed for each player’s strategies, and the replication dynamic equation and evolutionary stability strategy are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation. The aim is to promote value co-creation by analyzing the co-evolution mechanism of various stakeholder strategies in the ICV innovation ecosystem. The results show the following: (1) The best evolutionary stability strategy is the positive cross-border cooperation between the automotive enterprise and the intelligent automotive solution provider, while the government gradually does not provide subsidies. (2) The government’s subsidy support should be controlled within an appropriate range. If the subsidy is too great, the marginal effect of incentives will gradually weaken. (3) The players’ willingness to integrate across borders can be enhanced by a higher level of trust and resource complementarity between the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider. Also, liquidated damages and opportunity loss can effectively prevent the occurrence of negative integration behaviors. (4) The greater the risk attitude coefficient and risk aversion coefficient of the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider, the more conducive they are to the occurrence of positive integration behavior.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/2/121intelligent connected vehiclesinnovation ecosystemcross-border integrationevolutionary gamevalue co-creation |
| spellingShingle | Jinhuan Tang Yiming Chen Dan Zhao Shoufeng Ji Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry Systems intelligent connected vehicles innovation ecosystem cross-border integration evolutionary game value co-creation |
| title | Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry |
| title_full | Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry |
| title_fullStr | Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry |
| title_full_unstemmed | Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry |
| title_short | Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry |
| title_sort | research on value co creation evolution mechanism of cross border cooperation in intelligent connected vehicle industry |
| topic | intelligent connected vehicles innovation ecosystem cross-border integration evolutionary game value co-creation |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/2/121 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jinhuantang researchonvaluecocreationevolutionmechanismofcrossbordercooperationinintelligentconnectedvehicleindustry AT yimingchen researchonvaluecocreationevolutionmechanismofcrossbordercooperationinintelligentconnectedvehicleindustry AT danzhao researchonvaluecocreationevolutionmechanismofcrossbordercooperationinintelligentconnectedvehicleindustry AT shoufengji researchonvaluecocreationevolutionmechanismofcrossbordercooperationinintelligentconnectedvehicleindustry |