The Possibility of Kantian Armchair Knowledge
In his masterful essay, “Armchair Knowledge: Some Kantian Reflections”, A.W. Moore claims that Kant lapses into contradiction as a result of invoking transcendental idealism as a solution to the puzzle of what Moore calls “armchair knowledge”. Moore talks about “the incoherence of transcendental...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2022-03-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/162 |
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| Summary: | In his masterful essay, “Armchair Knowledge: Some Kantian Reflections”, A.W.
Moore claims that Kant lapses into contradiction as a result of invoking transcendental
idealism as a solution to the puzzle of what Moore calls “armchair knowledge”. Moore
talks about “the incoherence of transcendental idealism” and, through a discussion which
includes the question of whether different subjects possess different categories, offers an
account of armchair knowledge without transcendental idealism. He suggests we should
abandon the Kantian a priori intuitions and, with them, also Kant’s synthetic a priori
judgements. In this paper, I examine some of the problems identified by Moore in Kant’s
account. I do not aim to show that there is no internal inconsistency in Kant’s thought or
that Moore (perhaps continuing in this way Kant’s project of uncovering the deceptions of
transcendental judgements) might not be right to point to potential problems in Kant’s texts;
my claim is rather that there are resources in the Kantian corpus to explain away the main
contradictions and conflicts Moore identifies in Kant. |
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| ISSN: | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |