Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?

Starting in the second edition of the Essay, Locke becomes interested in the phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of will. As he conceives it, akrasia occurs when we will something contrary to what we acknowledge to be our greater good. This commitment represents an important shift from the first edit...

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Main Author: Samuel C. Rickless
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Aperio 2019-11-01
Series:Journal of Modern Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jmphil.org/article/id/2138/
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author Samuel C. Rickless
author_facet Samuel C. Rickless
author_sort Samuel C. Rickless
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description Starting in the second edition of the Essay, Locke becomes interested in the phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of will. As he conceives it, akrasia occurs when we will something contrary to what we acknowledge to be our greater good. This commitment represents an important shift from the first edition of the Essay, where Locke argues that the will is always determined by a judgement of our greater good. But traces of the first-edition view are present even in the second edition, so much so that it is unclear whether Locke is entitled to an explanation of akrasia at all. In this essay, we propose a new interpretation of Locke’s account of akrasia, one that mediates between his seemingly conflicting commitments. We believe that this interpretation represents an improvement over past interpretations, which make Locke’s conception of akrasia too weak to do the work he intends for it. Moreover, getting Locke’s account of akrasia right allows us to gain clarity on his view of the will, a subtle and ultimately quite plausible part of his moral psychology.
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spelling doaj-art-a45d55dac6af4be5940bf80fab2d76252025-01-31T16:07:57ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522019-11-011010.25894/jmp.2138Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?Samuel C. Rickless0 Starting in the second edition of the Essay, Locke becomes interested in the phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of will. As he conceives it, akrasia occurs when we will something contrary to what we acknowledge to be our greater good. This commitment represents an important shift from the first edition of the Essay, where Locke argues that the will is always determined by a judgement of our greater good. But traces of the first-edition view are present even in the second edition, so much so that it is unclear whether Locke is entitled to an explanation of akrasia at all. In this essay, we propose a new interpretation of Locke’s account of akrasia, one that mediates between his seemingly conflicting commitments. We believe that this interpretation represents an improvement over past interpretations, which make Locke’s conception of akrasia too weak to do the work he intends for it. Moreover, getting Locke’s account of akrasia right allows us to gain clarity on his view of the will, a subtle and ultimately quite plausible part of his moral psychology.https://jmphil.org/article/id/2138/Lockeakrasiairrationalityjudgementaction
spellingShingle Samuel C. Rickless
Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?
Journal of Modern Philosophy
Locke
akrasia
irrationality
judgement
action
title Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?
title_full Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?
title_fullStr Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?
title_full_unstemmed Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?
title_short Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?
title_sort does locke have an akrasia problem
topic Locke
akrasia
irrationality
judgement
action
url https://jmphil.org/article/id/2138/
work_keys_str_mv AT samuelcrickless doeslockehaveanakrasiaproblem