What is this thing called dialetheism?
This paper has two parts. In the first I discuss two claims made by Priest in Some Comments and Replies (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3 27, 2019): (i) that the idea of ‘contradictions in reality’ lacks textual support in his work, and (ii) that such contradictions would require a theory of truth as...
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2025-07-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/107886 |
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| author | Abilio Rodrigues |
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| author_sort | Abilio Rodrigues |
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This paper has two parts. In the first I discuss two claims made by Priest in Some Comments and Replies (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3 27, 2019): (i) that the idea of ‘contradictions in reality’ lacks textual support in his work, and (ii) that such contradictions would require a theory of truth as correspondence with entities such as facts or states of affairs. With respect to (i), I will recognize that, after a closer reading of his texts, in particular In Contradiction (2nd edition, OUP, 2006), I have not been able to find clear examples of dialetheias related to real contradictions. As far as I could see, for Priest, dialetheism is mainly a thesis about our conceptual framework and mental processes. As for (ii), in opposition to him, I will argue that all we need to make sense of the idea of contradictions in reality is the apparatus provided by Tarski’s definition of truth, and an object a and a predicate P such that a satisfies both P and ¬P. In the second part, I discuss what one must accept to be a dialetheist and what is required for dialetheism to be a plausible and interesting thesis. My conclusion is that dialetheism ends up being either a strong but implausible thesis about contradictions in extra-mental and extra-linguistic phenomena, or a weaker but interesting claim about contradictions produced by thought and language.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-a427730df49a44aa83d33f4897af298b |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-07-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj-art-a427730df49a44aa83d33f4897af298b2025-08-20T03:51:02ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1808-17112025-07-0129210.5007/1808-1711.2025.e107886What is this thing called dialetheism?Abilio Rodrigues0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6639-9550Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais This paper has two parts. In the first I discuss two claims made by Priest in Some Comments and Replies (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3 27, 2019): (i) that the idea of ‘contradictions in reality’ lacks textual support in his work, and (ii) that such contradictions would require a theory of truth as correspondence with entities such as facts or states of affairs. With respect to (i), I will recognize that, after a closer reading of his texts, in particular In Contradiction (2nd edition, OUP, 2006), I have not been able to find clear examples of dialetheias related to real contradictions. As far as I could see, for Priest, dialetheism is mainly a thesis about our conceptual framework and mental processes. As for (ii), in opposition to him, I will argue that all we need to make sense of the idea of contradictions in reality is the apparatus provided by Tarski’s definition of truth, and an object a and a predicate P such that a satisfies both P and ¬P. In the second part, I discuss what one must accept to be a dialetheist and what is required for dialetheism to be a plausible and interesting thesis. My conclusion is that dialetheism ends up being either a strong but implausible thesis about contradictions in extra-mental and extra-linguistic phenomena, or a weaker but interesting claim about contradictions produced by thought and language. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/107886ContradictionsNegationsParaconsistencyDialetheism |
| spellingShingle | Abilio Rodrigues What is this thing called dialetheism? Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Contradictions Negations Paraconsistency Dialetheism |
| title | What is this thing called dialetheism? |
| title_full | What is this thing called dialetheism? |
| title_fullStr | What is this thing called dialetheism? |
| title_full_unstemmed | What is this thing called dialetheism? |
| title_short | What is this thing called dialetheism? |
| title_sort | what is this thing called dialetheism |
| topic | Contradictions Negations Paraconsistency Dialetheism |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/107886 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT abiliorodrigues whatisthisthingcalleddialetheism |