The strategic effects of non-state shareholders’ governance: based on the perspective of product market performance of state-owned enterprises
Making state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises stronger, better, and larger is the key driving force for comprehensively building a modern socialist country. This paper studies the impact of non-state shareholders’ governance on the product market performance of state-owned enterprises under...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis Group
2024-04-01
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| Series: | China Journal of Accounting Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/21697213.2024.2334668 |
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| Summary: | Making state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises stronger, better, and larger is the key driving force for comprehensively building a modern socialist country. This paper studies the impact of non-state shareholders’ governance on the product market performance of state-owned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform. Our results show that under the control of equity balances, non-state shareholders appointing directors to participate in governance can optimise the strategic decision-making of state-owned enterprises, promote product and service R&D innovation, and improve the operational efficiency of state-owned enterprises, thereby having a positive impact on the product market performance of state-owned enterprises. And this kind of governance effect is more obvious in state-owned enterprises in local control and competitive industries. Further research finds that the strategic effect of non-state shareholders’ governance not only has long-term sustained characteristics but also has a positive spillover impact on the capital market value and operating performance of state-owned enterprises. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-7213 2169-7221 |