Evolutionary Game Analysis and Strategy Optimization for Short-Video Platform Regulation Under Cyber Space Governance
This study explores the key issues in the construction of short-video network ecology, focusing on the strategic interaction between regulatory agencies and short-video creation platforms, which is a key aspect to achieve efficient cyberspace governance. By designing an evolutionary game model betwe...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mathematics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jom/6498289 |
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| Summary: | This study explores the key issues in the construction of short-video network ecology, focusing on the strategic interaction between regulatory agencies and short-video creation platforms, which is a key aspect to achieve efficient cyberspace governance. By designing an evolutionary game model between the government and the short-video platform, this paper systematically analyzes the dynamic strategic choice and adaptation process of participants, which provides a solid theoretical and methodological foundation for understanding strategic interaction in the digital environment. The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows. (1) Precision of adjustment of regulatory parameters: it quantitatively demonstrates the profound impact of subtle adjustment of cost, penalty, and subsidy parameters on the strategic evolution of governments and platforms, provides refined sensitivity analysis for policy design, and strengthens the connection between theory and practice. (2) Characteristics of the coexistence of equilibrium and oscillation phenomena: through simulation experiments, the characteristics of the coexistence of dual steady states and periodic oscillations under the current subsidy and punishment framework are revealed, which provides new evidence for the equilibrium theory of digital ecosystem and highlights the significance of pursuing lasting stability in dynamic situations. (3) Breakthroughs in the theory and practice of governance dynamics: for systemic instability, we innovatively design and verify two dynamic adjustment mechanisms, with special emphasis on the effectiveness of dynamic punishment strategies. This provides a scientific basis for optimizing the stability of the model and points out a new direction for the evolution of adaptive digital governance. Based on the findings, this study argues for the adoption of a dynamic punishment policy, emphasizing its adaptability to the rapid evolution of the short-video landscape and its potential to foster a regulated but vibrant online ecosystem. |
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| ISSN: | 2314-4785 |