Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty
Abstract Does competition increase cheating? This question has been investigated by both psychologists and economists in the past and received conflicting answers. Notably, prior experimental work compared how people behaved under competitive and non-competitive tasks that were associated with diffe...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Nature Portfolio
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Scientific Reports |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-83621-y |
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| author | Andras Molnar Gabriele Paolacci |
| author_facet | Andras Molnar Gabriele Paolacci |
| author_sort | Andras Molnar |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Does competition increase cheating? This question has been investigated by both psychologists and economists in the past and received conflicting answers. Notably, prior experimental work compared how people behaved under competitive and non-competitive tasks that were associated with different levels of uncertainty about the reward that people would receive. We aim to experimentally disentangle the effect of competition from the effects of uncertain rewards. We conducted an incentivized, pre-registered study featuring real-time interaction between participants (N = 765). We introduce an uncertain non-competitive incentive scheme along with the certain non-competitive scheme and the (uncertain) competitive scheme. We find that competition significantly increases the magnitude (but not the prevalence) of cheating relative to both non-competitive schemes, with the effect of competition being larger when the level of uncertainty is held constant across schemes. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-a2604302a65b40c7a92995c2bd597b25 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2045-2322 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-12-01 |
| publisher | Nature Portfolio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Scientific Reports |
| spelling | doaj-art-a2604302a65b40c7a92995c2bd597b252025-01-05T12:27:50ZengNature PortfolioScientific Reports2045-23222024-12-0114111010.1038/s41598-024-83621-yCompetition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertaintyAndras Molnar0Gabriele Paolacci1Department of Psychology, University of MichiganRotterdam School of Management, Erasmus UniversityAbstract Does competition increase cheating? This question has been investigated by both psychologists and economists in the past and received conflicting answers. Notably, prior experimental work compared how people behaved under competitive and non-competitive tasks that were associated with different levels of uncertainty about the reward that people would receive. We aim to experimentally disentangle the effect of competition from the effects of uncertain rewards. We conducted an incentivized, pre-registered study featuring real-time interaction between participants (N = 765). We introduce an uncertain non-competitive incentive scheme along with the certain non-competitive scheme and the (uncertain) competitive scheme. We find that competition significantly increases the magnitude (but not the prevalence) of cheating relative to both non-competitive schemes, with the effect of competition being larger when the level of uncertainty is held constant across schemes.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-83621-yCheatingCompetition(dis)honestyEffortRiskUncertainty |
| spellingShingle | Andras Molnar Gabriele Paolacci Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty Scientific Reports Cheating Competition (dis)honesty Effort Risk Uncertainty |
| title | Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty |
| title_full | Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty |
| title_fullStr | Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty |
| title_short | Competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty |
| title_sort | competition increases the magnitude of dishonest reporting even when controlling for reward uncertainty |
| topic | Cheating Competition (dis)honesty Effort Risk Uncertainty |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-83621-y |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT andrasmolnar competitionincreasesthemagnitudeofdishonestreportingevenwhencontrollingforrewarduncertainty AT gabrielepaolacci competitionincreasesthemagnitudeofdishonestreportingevenwhencontrollingforrewarduncertainty |