The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies
In the electricity bidding market, power generation companies and distribution-oriented grid enterprises face increasingly complex and dynamic decision-making challenges that cannot be fully captured by static or one-shot approaches. To address these challenges, this study proposes a novel evolution...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2025-06-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems |
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| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142061525001395 |
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| _version_ | 1850187714840756224 |
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| author | Lefeng Cheng Pan Peng Wentian Lu Jian Sun Fan Wu Mingming Shi Xiaodong Yuan Yang Chen |
| author_facet | Lefeng Cheng Pan Peng Wentian Lu Jian Sun Fan Wu Mingming Shi Xiaodong Yuan Yang Chen |
| author_sort | Lefeng Cheng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the electricity bidding market, power generation companies and distribution-oriented grid enterprises face increasingly complex and dynamic decision-making challenges that cannot be fully captured by static or one-shot approaches. To address these challenges, this study proposes a novel evolutionary game-theoretic framework featuring a “mixed-strategy distortion” mechanism, which introduces adaptive periodic adjustments in bidding ranges. This extension to classical evolutionary models reveals how cyclical constraints and strategic disruptions influence the emergence of cooperative equilibria and market dynamics. The study develops a theoretical framework for analyzing long-term stable equilibria in asymmetric evolutionary games involving distinct groups of power generators, underpinned by a renewable energy grid-connected benefit coordination model. Theoretical analyses are validated through dynamic simulations that examine the interplay of key parameters, including generation costs, local market demands, bidding ranges, and production capacities. The results demonstrate how variations in these factors influence the evolution of bidding strategies, providing insights into the stability of competitive equilibria in electricity markets. Furthermore, the findings highlight that rational adjustments to bidding intervals can mitigate distortions, reduce electricity prices, and promote dynamic market stability. By advancing the understanding of adaptive bidding strategies in competitive electricity markets, this research offers actionable insights for policy development, market regulation, and strategic decision-making for power generation enterprises and grid operators. These contributions provide a foundation for the design of more efficient market mechanisms, promoting both economic efficiency and sustainable energy transitions. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9feee73599044bea947c5b95df98c758 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 0142-0615 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-06-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems |
| spelling | doaj-art-9feee73599044bea947c5b95df98c7582025-08-20T02:16:02ZengElsevierInternational Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems0142-06152025-06-0116711058810.1016/j.ijepes.2025.110588The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companiesLefeng Cheng0Pan Peng1Wentian Lu2Jian Sun3Fan Wu4Mingming Shi5Xiaodong Yuan6Yang Chen7School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006 Guangdong Province, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006 Guangdong Province, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006 Guangdong Province, China; Corresponding authors.Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211103 Jiangsu Province, ChinaElectric Power Research Institute of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211103 Jiangsu Province, ChinaElectric Power Research Institute of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211103 Jiangsu Province, ChinaElectric Power Research Institute of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211103 Jiangsu Province, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006 Guangdong Province, China; Corresponding authors.In the electricity bidding market, power generation companies and distribution-oriented grid enterprises face increasingly complex and dynamic decision-making challenges that cannot be fully captured by static or one-shot approaches. To address these challenges, this study proposes a novel evolutionary game-theoretic framework featuring a “mixed-strategy distortion” mechanism, which introduces adaptive periodic adjustments in bidding ranges. This extension to classical evolutionary models reveals how cyclical constraints and strategic disruptions influence the emergence of cooperative equilibria and market dynamics. The study develops a theoretical framework for analyzing long-term stable equilibria in asymmetric evolutionary games involving distinct groups of power generators, underpinned by a renewable energy grid-connected benefit coordination model. Theoretical analyses are validated through dynamic simulations that examine the interplay of key parameters, including generation costs, local market demands, bidding ranges, and production capacities. The results demonstrate how variations in these factors influence the evolution of bidding strategies, providing insights into the stability of competitive equilibria in electricity markets. Furthermore, the findings highlight that rational adjustments to bidding intervals can mitigate distortions, reduce electricity prices, and promote dynamic market stability. By advancing the understanding of adaptive bidding strategies in competitive electricity markets, this research offers actionable insights for policy development, market regulation, and strategic decision-making for power generation enterprises and grid operators. These contributions provide a foundation for the design of more efficient market mechanisms, promoting both economic efficiency and sustainable energy transitions.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142061525001395Bounded rationalityMulti-population dynamicsPower marketMethod selection criteriaEvolutionary game equilibriumAsymptotic stability |
| spellingShingle | Lefeng Cheng Pan Peng Wentian Lu Jian Sun Fan Wu Mingming Shi Xiaodong Yuan Yang Chen The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems Bounded rationality Multi-population dynamics Power market Method selection criteria Evolutionary game equilibrium Asymptotic stability |
| title | The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies |
| title_full | The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies |
| title_fullStr | The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies |
| title_full_unstemmed | The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies |
| title_short | The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies |
| title_sort | evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies |
| topic | Bounded rationality Multi-population dynamics Power market Method selection criteria Evolutionary game equilibrium Asymptotic stability |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142061525001395 |
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