THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR
My investigation reveals that Heidegger’s account of affectivity – though his programmatical determination included an ontical dimension or otherwise lived, personal experiences – is overshadowed by a dense ontology that cannot enable real phenomenal experience. This is why he could not account for...
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Babeș-Bolyai University
2021-10-01
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| Series: | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
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| Online Access: | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/347 |
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| author | Dominic Nnaemeka EKWEARIRI |
| author_facet | Dominic Nnaemeka EKWEARIRI |
| author_sort | Dominic Nnaemeka EKWEARIRI |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | My investigation reveals that Heidegger’s account of affectivity – though his programmatical determination included an ontical dimension or otherwise lived, personal experiences – is overshadowed by a dense ontology that cannot enable real phenomenal experience. This is why he could not account for other affective states such as emotions, feelings and the role of the body in affectivity. Besides, in that account we are lost when we seek to answer the question of whether moods are “one” or “many”. My aim is to point out how these deficiencies in Heidegger’s account of mood could be overcome in Richir’s account of affectivity, where indeterminate background feelings (affections) could give rise to a determinate and occurrent emotion (affects). The advantage of this move is a rich ontic account of affectivity where not only the body but also sense/meaning of affective episodes play a robust role in an encounter of world events. If Richir reproached Heidegger for existential solipsism, one could now reproach the former for existentiell/phenomenal solipsism. In the end I suggest that these two core but opposite aspects of affectivity (the ontological and the ontic) belong to the same reality: Dasein is not just in the world (ontology), but also the world is in Dasein (ontic/phenomenological). |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9f53708da0444b35b52f0851db257586 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2065-9407 |
| language | deu |
| publishDate | 2021-10-01 |
| publisher | Babeș-Bolyai University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
| spelling | doaj-art-9f53708da0444b35b52f0851db2575862025-08-20T03:34:13ZdeuBabeș-Bolyai UniversityStudia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia2065-94072021-10-01662 Supplement10.24193/subbphil.2021.2s.04THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIRDominic Nnaemeka EKWEARIRI0Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster, Germany; Department of Philosophy, Institut für Transzendentalphilosophie und Phänomenologie, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany; Marc-Richir-Archiv, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany, ekweariri@uni-muenster.de; dominicemfr@gmail.comMy investigation reveals that Heidegger’s account of affectivity – though his programmatical determination included an ontical dimension or otherwise lived, personal experiences – is overshadowed by a dense ontology that cannot enable real phenomenal experience. This is why he could not account for other affective states such as emotions, feelings and the role of the body in affectivity. Besides, in that account we are lost when we seek to answer the question of whether moods are “one” or “many”. My aim is to point out how these deficiencies in Heidegger’s account of mood could be overcome in Richir’s account of affectivity, where indeterminate background feelings (affections) could give rise to a determinate and occurrent emotion (affects). The advantage of this move is a rich ontic account of affectivity where not only the body but also sense/meaning of affective episodes play a robust role in an encounter of world events. If Richir reproached Heidegger for existential solipsism, one could now reproach the former for existentiell/phenomenal solipsism. In the end I suggest that these two core but opposite aspects of affectivity (the ontological and the ontic) belong to the same reality: Dasein is not just in the world (ontology), but also the world is in Dasein (ontic/phenomenological).https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/347mood, affection, affect, Heidegger’s ontology, Richir’s Leib and sense. |
| spellingShingle | Dominic Nnaemeka EKWEARIRI THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia mood, affection, affect, Heidegger’s ontology, Richir’s Leib and sense. |
| title | THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR |
| title_full | THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR |
| title_fullStr | THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR |
| title_full_unstemmed | THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR |
| title_short | THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR |
| title_sort | world relatedness of affectivity heidegger and richir |
| topic | mood, affection, affect, Heidegger’s ontology, Richir’s Leib and sense. |
| url | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/347 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dominicnnaemekaekweariri theworldrelatednessofaffectivityheideggerandrichir AT dominicnnaemekaekweariri worldrelatednessofaffectivityheideggerandrichir |