Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty
In order to enhance the demand response rate on the demand side and the wind power accommodation rate on the supply side, as well as to curtail the operational cost effectively, this paper formulates a day-ahead and intraday economic dispatch model predicated on Stackelberg game theory. Within this...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2025-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
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| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10843199/ |
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| author | Ning Li Weibo Liu Xiaodong Wan Xiu Ren Haining Yu |
| author_facet | Ning Li Weibo Liu Xiaodong Wan Xiu Ren Haining Yu |
| author_sort | Ning Li |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In order to enhance the demand response rate on the demand side and the wind power accommodation rate on the supply side, as well as to curtail the operational cost effectively, this paper formulates a day-ahead and intraday economic dispatch model predicated on Stackelberg game theory. Within this model, specific attention is given to the influence of source-load uncertainties on energy prices, and the concept of the net load is incorporated during the intraday phase to meticulously calibrate intraday prices. For the purpose of resolving the devised model, an ameliorated lighting attachment procedure optimization algorithm is employed. Via simulation and comparative analysis, the energy pricing strategy proposed herein markedly bolsters the users’ engagement in demand response and the wind power accommodation rate, concomitantly reducing the operational cost. Furthermore, by leveraging the improved Lightning Attachment Procedure Optimization algorithm to address this model, the system cost is decreased by 9.6%, and the iteration speed is increased by 18.75%. This research provides robust support for overcoming the dual conundrums of demand response and wind power accommodation in contemporary energy systems. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9f3765ae5a70468bba06318117c093cf |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj-art-9f3765ae5a70468bba06318117c093cf2025-01-25T00:01:41ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362025-01-0113143441435710.1109/ACCESS.2025.353015310843199Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load UncertaintyNing Li0https://orcid.org/0009-0007-8166-1714Weibo Liu1Xiaodong Wan2Xiu Ren3Haining Yu4https://orcid.org/0009-0002-1402-8752Shandong Cancer Hospital and Institute, Shandong First Medical University (Shandong Academy of Medical Sciences), Jinan, ChinaShandong Cancer Hospital and Institute, Shandong First Medical University (Shandong Academy of Medical Sciences), Jinan, ChinaState Grid Shandong Qingdao Power Supply Company, Qingdao, ChinaShandong Cancer Hospital and Institute, Shandong First Medical University (Shandong Academy of Medical Sciences), Jinan, ChinaShandong Cancer Hospital and Institute, Shandong First Medical University (Shandong Academy of Medical Sciences), Jinan, ChinaIn order to enhance the demand response rate on the demand side and the wind power accommodation rate on the supply side, as well as to curtail the operational cost effectively, this paper formulates a day-ahead and intraday economic dispatch model predicated on Stackelberg game theory. Within this model, specific attention is given to the influence of source-load uncertainties on energy prices, and the concept of the net load is incorporated during the intraday phase to meticulously calibrate intraday prices. For the purpose of resolving the devised model, an ameliorated lighting attachment procedure optimization algorithm is employed. Via simulation and comparative analysis, the energy pricing strategy proposed herein markedly bolsters the users’ engagement in demand response and the wind power accommodation rate, concomitantly reducing the operational cost. Furthermore, by leveraging the improved Lightning Attachment Procedure Optimization algorithm to address this model, the system cost is decreased by 9.6%, and the iteration speed is increased by 18.75%. This research provides robust support for overcoming the dual conundrums of demand response and wind power accommodation in contemporary energy systems.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10843199/Uncertaintymulti-time scalereal-time pricingStackelberg gamedemand response |
| spellingShingle | Ning Li Weibo Liu Xiaodong Wan Xiu Ren Haining Yu Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty IEEE Access Uncertainty multi-time scale real-time pricing Stackelberg game demand response |
| title | Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty |
| title_full | Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty |
| title_fullStr | Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty |
| title_full_unstemmed | Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty |
| title_short | Day-Ahead and Intraday Economic Optimization Models of the Stackelberg Game Considering Source-Load Uncertainty |
| title_sort | day ahead and intraday economic optimization models of the stackelberg game considering source load uncertainty |
| topic | Uncertainty multi-time scale real-time pricing Stackelberg game demand response |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10843199/ |
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