Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on clus...

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Main Authors: Ying Han, Guohong Chen, Elena Poh
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2018-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5267357
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author Ying Han
Guohong Chen
Elena Poh
author_facet Ying Han
Guohong Chen
Elena Poh
author_sort Ying Han
collection DOAJ
description Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1026-0226
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series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
spelling doaj-art-9c37e0561559477fac6b5be79114bec22025-02-03T05:51:17ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2018-01-01201810.1155/2018/52673575267357Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game AnalysisYing Han0Guohong Chen1Elena Poh2School of Economics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, 350117, ChinaBusiness School, Yango University, Fuzhou, 350015, ChinaDepartment of Biomedical Engineering, National University of Singapore, 119077, SingaporeIndustrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5267357
spellingShingle Ying Han
Guohong Chen
Elena Poh
Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_full Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_fullStr Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_full_unstemmed Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_short Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_sort effects of informal contracts on innovative cooperation among enterprises in industrial clusters an evolutionary game analysis
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5267357
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AT guohongchen effectsofinformalcontractsoninnovativecooperationamongenterprisesinindustrialclustersanevolutionarygameanalysis
AT elenapoh effectsofinformalcontractsoninnovativecooperationamongenterprisesinindustrialclustersanevolutionarygameanalysis