A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks
This paper proposes a novel proactive defense strategy tailored to address false-data-injection (FDI) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Specifically targeting FDI attacks, which compromise system integrity by manipulating sensor and control inputs, watermarking and moving target defense (MTD...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2025-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
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| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11003871/ |
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| author | Yateng Wang Ziang Wei Rui Liu |
| author_facet | Yateng Wang Ziang Wei Rui Liu |
| author_sort | Yateng Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper proposes a novel proactive defense strategy tailored to address false-data-injection (FDI) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Specifically targeting FDI attacks, which compromise system integrity by manipulating sensor and control inputs, watermarking and moving target defense (MTD) mechanisms are integrated. The watermarking signal is designed to encrypt control inputs, enabling the detection of FDI attacks by exploiting inconsistencies between injected false data and the known watermark pattern. Meanwhile, the MTD strategy, characterized by mode-dependent average dwell time (MDADT), dynamically alters system parameters to obscure attack surfaces. Sufficient conditions for robust <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$H_{\infty } $ </tex-math></inline-formula> disturbance attenuation in switched systems under these defenses are derived. Furthermore, tailored response mechanisms are formulated to mitigate attack impacts on system performance, with quantitative comparisons demonstrating the efficacy of the proposed methods against FDI attacks. Numerical simulations validate the robustness and superiority of the hybrid defense strategy in scenarios involving FDI attacks. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9a09b9317ca94361998ea7b8b0705016 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj-art-9a09b9317ca94361998ea7b8b07050162025-08-20T02:26:51ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362025-01-0113864878649710.1109/ACCESS.2025.356980711003871A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI AttacksYateng Wang0Ziang Wei1https://orcid.org/0009-0000-4472-3110Rui Liu2Department of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Wenhua College, Wuhan, ChinaSchool of Electrical and Information Engineering, Wuhan Institute of Technology, Wuhan, ChinaDepartment of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Wenhua College, Wuhan, ChinaThis paper proposes a novel proactive defense strategy tailored to address false-data-injection (FDI) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Specifically targeting FDI attacks, which compromise system integrity by manipulating sensor and control inputs, watermarking and moving target defense (MTD) mechanisms are integrated. The watermarking signal is designed to encrypt control inputs, enabling the detection of FDI attacks by exploiting inconsistencies between injected false data and the known watermark pattern. Meanwhile, the MTD strategy, characterized by mode-dependent average dwell time (MDADT), dynamically alters system parameters to obscure attack surfaces. Sufficient conditions for robust <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$H_{\infty } $ </tex-math></inline-formula> disturbance attenuation in switched systems under these defenses are derived. Furthermore, tailored response mechanisms are formulated to mitigate attack impacts on system performance, with quantitative comparisons demonstrating the efficacy of the proposed methods against FDI attacks. Numerical simulations validate the robustness and superiority of the hybrid defense strategy in scenarios involving FDI attacks.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11003871/Cyber-physical systemsproactive defense strategyswitching signal |
| spellingShingle | Yateng Wang Ziang Wei Rui Liu A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks IEEE Access Cyber-physical systems proactive defense strategy switching signal |
| title | A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks |
| title_full | A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks |
| title_fullStr | A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks |
| title_short | A Novel Proactive Defense Strategy Design for Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of FDI Attacks |
| title_sort | novel proactive defense strategy design for cyber physical systems in the presence of fdi attacks |
| topic | Cyber-physical systems proactive defense strategy switching signal |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11003871/ |
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