Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game

Security in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) is challenging due to the ability of adversaries to gather necessary intelligence to launch insider jamming attacks. The solutions to prevent external attacks on MANET are not applicable for defense against insider jamming attacks. There is a need for a fo...

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Main Authors: Ashraf Al Sharah, Taiwo Oyedare, Sachin Shetty
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2016-01-01
Series:Journal of Computer Networks and Communications
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/4289176
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author Ashraf Al Sharah
Taiwo Oyedare
Sachin Shetty
author_facet Ashraf Al Sharah
Taiwo Oyedare
Sachin Shetty
author_sort Ashraf Al Sharah
collection DOAJ
description Security in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) is challenging due to the ability of adversaries to gather necessary intelligence to launch insider jamming attacks. The solutions to prevent external attacks on MANET are not applicable for defense against insider jamming attacks. There is a need for a formal framework to characterize the information required by adversaries to launch insider jamming attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel reputation-based coalition game in MANETs to detect and mitigate insider jamming attacks. Since there is no centralized controller in MANETs, the nodes rely heavily on availability of transmission rates and a reputation for each individual node in the coalition to detect the presence of internal jamming node. The nodes will form a stable grand coalition in order to make a strategic security defense decision, maintain the grand coalition based on node reputation, and exclude any malicious node based on reputation value. Simulation results show that our approach provides a framework to quantify information needed by adversaries to launch insider attacks. The proposed approach will improve MANET’s defense against insider attacks, while also reducing incorrect classification of legitimate nodes as jammers.
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institution Kabale University
issn 2090-7141
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spelling doaj-art-98ce585f11f946acb31a0a2926c7d5aa2025-02-03T00:59:52ZengWileyJournal of Computer Networks and Communications2090-71412090-715X2016-01-01201610.1155/2016/42891764289176Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition GameAshraf Al Sharah0Taiwo Oyedare1Sachin Shetty2Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee State University, Nashville, TN 37209, USADepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee State University, Nashville, TN 37209, USADepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee State University, Nashville, TN 37209, USASecurity in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) is challenging due to the ability of adversaries to gather necessary intelligence to launch insider jamming attacks. The solutions to prevent external attacks on MANET are not applicable for defense against insider jamming attacks. There is a need for a formal framework to characterize the information required by adversaries to launch insider jamming attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel reputation-based coalition game in MANETs to detect and mitigate insider jamming attacks. Since there is no centralized controller in MANETs, the nodes rely heavily on availability of transmission rates and a reputation for each individual node in the coalition to detect the presence of internal jamming node. The nodes will form a stable grand coalition in order to make a strategic security defense decision, maintain the grand coalition based on node reputation, and exclude any malicious node based on reputation value. Simulation results show that our approach provides a framework to quantify information needed by adversaries to launch insider attacks. The proposed approach will improve MANET’s defense against insider attacks, while also reducing incorrect classification of legitimate nodes as jammers.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/4289176
spellingShingle Ashraf Al Sharah
Taiwo Oyedare
Sachin Shetty
Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game
Journal of Computer Networks and Communications
title Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game
title_full Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game
title_fullStr Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game
title_full_unstemmed Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game
title_short Detecting and Mitigating Smart Insider Jamming Attacks in MANETs Using Reputation-Based Coalition Game
title_sort detecting and mitigating smart insider jamming attacks in manets using reputation based coalition game
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/4289176
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AT sachinshetty detectingandmitigatingsmartinsiderjammingattacksinmanetsusingreputationbasedcoalitiongame