Editorial: rewriting the German fundamental law in a blitz
Introduced in 2009, the debt brake instantly became a defining element of the German Fundamental Law. During the Eurozone fiscal crisis, it grew into the main constitutional export of the Merkel/Schäuble government, an executive remembered by its imposing austerity policies to ‘save’ the Eurozone. I...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2024-12-01
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| Series: | European Law Open |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2752613525000189/type/journal_article |
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| Summary: | Introduced in 2009, the debt brake instantly became a defining element of the German Fundamental Law. During the Eurozone fiscal crisis, it grew into the main constitutional export of the Merkel/Schäuble government, an executive remembered by its imposing austerity policies to ‘save’ the Eurozone. In what comes close to a U turn, Friedrich Merz, the German Chancellor in pectore, promoted in the early days of March 2025 an amendment to the Fundamental Law which, in less than a month, resulted in a radical recalibration of the debt brake. This editorial considers the very idiosyncratic procedure of reform followed in Germany, including the rather exceptional rulings produced by the German Federal Constitutional Court. I conclude by considering whether, politically and morally, it is wise for Germany to partially dismantle the break without some serious reconsideration of the effects that the previous “Germanisation” of the Eurozone had, and without some form of consultation with its European peers. Before that, I reconstruct how Germany shifted from debt brake enthusiasm to debt brake disenchantment. |
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| ISSN: | 2752-6135 |