Desire in Spinoza's Value Epistemology
Spinoza claims that the good is what leads us to perfection. Yet he also affirms that whether we judge something to be good depends on whether or not we desire it. It is thus unclear whether Spinoza ultimately analyzes value in terms of perfection or in terms of desire. This is a well-known debate i...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Aperio
2025-06-01
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| Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2473/ |
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| Summary: | Spinoza claims that the good is what leads us to perfection. Yet he also affirms that whether we judge something to be good depends on whether or not we desire it. It is thus unclear whether Spinoza ultimately analyzes value in terms of perfection or in terms of desire. This is a well-known debate in the literature, but its dialectical complexity is underappreciated. Defenders of the first interpretation must explain not only why Spinoza might analyze the good in terms of perfection, but also why he claims that our judgments of value depend on our desires. They standardly argue that, for Spinoza, our desires offer epistemic justification for these judgments. In this paper, however, I argue that this reading fails. My argument supports the views on which desire plays a role in Spinoza’s account of the nature of value itself, and not merely in his value epistemology. |
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| ISSN: | 2644-0652 |