Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?

The neuroscientific approach of mental disorders bases itself almost exclusively on an objectivist conception of psychiatry, a conception that only grants importance to those difficulties that can be (directly or indirectly) observed, at the expense of how these difficulties are experienced by the p...

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Main Authors: Pierre Bovet, Josef Parnas
Format: Article
Language:fra
Published: Société d'Anthropologie des Connaissances 2013-09-01
Series:Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.openedition.org/rac/4524
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author Pierre Bovet
Josef Parnas
author_facet Pierre Bovet
Josef Parnas
author_sort Pierre Bovet
collection DOAJ
description The neuroscientific approach of mental disorders bases itself almost exclusively on an objectivist conception of psychiatry, a conception that only grants importance to those difficulties that can be (directly or indirectly) observed, at the expense of how these difficulties are experienced by the patient. By taking schizophrenia and the vulnerability to this pathology as an example, we argue that an epistemology that considers the structure of human subjectivity, and what we know of its ontogenesis during infancy, could be more useful.
format Article
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language fra
publishDate 2013-09-01
publisher Société d'Anthropologie des Connaissances
record_format Article
series Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances
spelling doaj-art-8f18216ddf354512aaf57a424bd5ce932025-08-20T03:10:35ZfraSociété d'Anthropologie des ConnaissancesRevue d'anthropologie des connaissances1760-53932013-09-017310.3917/rac.020.0655Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?Pierre BovetJosef ParnasThe neuroscientific approach of mental disorders bases itself almost exclusively on an objectivist conception of psychiatry, a conception that only grants importance to those difficulties that can be (directly or indirectly) observed, at the expense of how these difficulties are experienced by the patient. By taking schizophrenia and the vulnerability to this pathology as an example, we argue that an epistemology that considers the structure of human subjectivity, and what we know of its ontogenesis during infancy, could be more useful.https://journals.openedition.org/rac/4524epistemologyneurosciencepsychiatryobjectivismphenomenologysubjectivity
spellingShingle Pierre Bovet
Josef Parnas
Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?
Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances
epistemology
neuroscience
psychiatry
objectivism
phenomenology
subjectivity
title Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?
title_full Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?
title_fullStr Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?
title_full_unstemmed Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?
title_short Quelle épistémologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie ?
title_sort quelle epistemologie pour les neurosciences en psychiatrie
topic epistemology
neuroscience
psychiatry
objectivism
phenomenology
subjectivity
url https://journals.openedition.org/rac/4524
work_keys_str_mv AT pierrebovet quelleepistemologiepourlesneurosciencesenpsychiatrie
AT josefparnas quelleepistemologiepourlesneurosciencesenpsychiatrie