Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach
In response to the ongoing depletion of fishery resources, many countries now prioritize sustainable fish stock use and ecosystem protection, balancing ecological, economic, and social goals. Fishery subsidies are key in this shift, with their impact depending on design and implementation. In 2020,...
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MDPI AG
2025-07-01
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| Series: | Fishes |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2410-3888/10/7/356 |
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| author | Yujuan Li Brendan Moyle Shamim Shakur |
| author_facet | Yujuan Li Brendan Moyle Shamim Shakur |
| author_sort | Yujuan Li |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In response to the ongoing depletion of fishery resources, many countries now prioritize sustainable fish stock use and ecosystem protection, balancing ecological, economic, and social goals. Fishery subsidies are key in this shift, with their impact depending on design and implementation. In 2020, China introduced marine fishery resource conservation subsidies and simultaneously phased out a 15-year policy of harmful fuel subsidies. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic interactions between government authorities and fishermen across four institutional scenarios, each combining different forms of subsidies and penalties. The findings suggest that a dynamic approach, incorporating both subsidies and penalties, is most effective in promoting legal fishing practices and protecting marine resources. Additionally, the study emphasizes that the effectiveness of subsidies and penalties does not necessarily increase with their scale; instead, both must be carefully calibrated to sustainable and reasonable limits. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-8cc9cc3fd3dc4af68a78b6fcacf2a193 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2410-3888 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Fishes |
| spelling | doaj-art-8cc9cc3fd3dc4af68a78b6fcacf2a1932025-08-20T03:08:01ZengMDPI AGFishes2410-38882025-07-0110735610.3390/fishes10070356Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game ApproachYujuan Li0Brendan Moyle1Shamim Shakur2Business School, Yancheng Polytechnic College, 285 Jiefang Road, Yancheng 224007, ChinaSchool of Accountancy, Economics and Finance, Massey University, 151 Dairy Flat Highway, Albany, Auckland 0632, New ZealandSchool of Accountancy, Economics and Finance, Massey University, Tennent Drive, Palmerston North 4410, New ZealandIn response to the ongoing depletion of fishery resources, many countries now prioritize sustainable fish stock use and ecosystem protection, balancing ecological, economic, and social goals. Fishery subsidies are key in this shift, with their impact depending on design and implementation. In 2020, China introduced marine fishery resource conservation subsidies and simultaneously phased out a 15-year policy of harmful fuel subsidies. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic interactions between government authorities and fishermen across four institutional scenarios, each combining different forms of subsidies and penalties. The findings suggest that a dynamic approach, incorporating both subsidies and penalties, is most effective in promoting legal fishing practices and protecting marine resources. Additionally, the study emphasizes that the effectiveness of subsidies and penalties does not necessarily increase with their scale; instead, both must be carefully calibrated to sustainable and reasonable limits.https://www.mdpi.com/2410-3888/10/7/356fishery resource conservation subsidythe governmentfisherspenaltyevolutionary game theory |
| spellingShingle | Yujuan Li Brendan Moyle Shamim Shakur Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach Fishes fishery resource conservation subsidy the government fishers penalty evolutionary game theory |
| title | Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
| title_full | Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
| title_fullStr | Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
| title_short | Fishery Resource Conservation Subsidies and Penalties in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach |
| title_sort | fishery resource conservation subsidies and penalties in china an evolutionary game approach |
| topic | fishery resource conservation subsidy the government fishers penalty evolutionary game theory |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2410-3888/10/7/356 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yujuanli fisheryresourceconservationsubsidiesandpenaltiesinchinaanevolutionarygameapproach AT brendanmoyle fisheryresourceconservationsubsidiesandpenaltiesinchinaanevolutionarygameapproach AT shamimshakur fisheryresourceconservationsubsidiesandpenaltiesinchinaanevolutionarygameapproach |