The Hegemony of Financial Experts and Big Global Banks: a Critical Analysis of International Banking Rules
This article provides a critical political economy analysis of global banking regulations formulated by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board. By examining the political bias in rules that appear neutral, elucidating the intellectual leadership exercised by technocratic spaces where...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2025-01-01
|
| Series: | Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.journals.unam.mx/index.php/rmcpys/article/view/82982 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | This article provides a critical political economy analysis of global banking regulations formulated by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board. By examining the political bias in rules that appear neutral, elucidating the intellectual leadership exercised by technocratic spaces where these banking regulations are developed, and exploring the legitimacy these spaces and regulations gain among key stakeholders, it argues that the prevailing economic discourse in these regulations, though seemingly apolitical, aligns with the consolidation of a hegemonic structure that favors banks deemed too big to fail.
Resumen
Este artículo ofrece una lectura crítica de economía política sobre las normas bancarias globales formuladas en el Comité de Basilea y el Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera. Al examinar el sesgo político en reglas que aparentan ser neutrales, dilucidar el liderazgo intelectual de los espacios tecnocráticos donde se desarrollan dichas normas, y analizar la legitimidad que estos espacios y sus normas adquieren frente a actores clave, se argumenta que el discurso económico dominante en estas regulaciones, aunque aparentemente apolítico, está alineado con la consolidación de una estructura hegemónica que favorece a los bancos demasiado grandes para quebrar.
|
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0185-1918 2448-492X |